Book Reviews


For a long time it has been held that institutions contribute little or next to nothing when it comes to the behavior of political actors. The thesis was embraced primarily by the actor theorists who held that the behavior of actors is institutions-resistant. Its major appeal lied in the fact that actors might be willing to set up democratic institutions, but they do it as a façade, never respecting them. Theories of institutional design, naturally enough, assume the opposite. But theorists of institutional design concede that institutions matter only if there is an undisputed will among actors to respect institutions at least minimally, or if there is some external force that will make actors respect the institutions.

*Democracy in Divided Societies* confirms this thesis. The book’s major goal is to advocate centripetal approach to designing electoral systems by pointing to their relevance for societies torn by ethnic conflicts. Reilly’s question is ‘How is it possible to avoid [ethnic] conflicts and instead promote inter-ethnic accommodation, multi-ethnic political parties and centripetal, center-based politics?’ His solution suggests that a lot can be done by invoking and implementing the proper electoral system. This book spells out what its major elements are.

Reilly rejects idealistic, rationalistic and utopian definitions of democracy. He rather opts for empirical, institutional and procedural definitions. The case in point is Joseph Schumpeter’s definition by which democracy is understood as ‘that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote.’ This definition is predicated on an implicit presupposition that people behave rationally and will naturally converge towards common interest of supporting institutions whatever they might look like. Although Reilly embraces the model of democracy that derives from this presumption, he is aware that the problem with this approach, just like with other models of democracy that is based on the idea of common participation and republican citizenship, is that it cannot so easily work in ethnically divided societies. All models tend to converge towards the center, while the politics in ethnically divided societies tend to be characterized by centrifugal forces. Not only that such societies are politically divided but the politics in them often results in armed conflicts or wars. Reilly mentions that in 1989-99 out of 110 major armed conflicts only seven were conflicts between two states; the rest were ethnic conflicts within a society.

Ethnically divided society is ‘a society which is ethnically
diverse and where ethnicity is a politically salient cleavage around which interests are organized for political purposes such as elections.’ The defining feature of such a society and its politics is that conflicts are always zero-sum games. The ‘winner take all’ politics implies that some groups are always included, while others are always excluded from the game. As Reilly put it, ‘a frequent result in multiethnic societies is that optimal outcomes for one player or group [...] are accompanied by sub-optimal outcomes for the society as a whole.’ Reilly notes that this is so partly because institutional design supports this kind of politics, but if the design is changed, then the political behavior and political practice could also be changed. A main challenge for institutional design is to transform ethnic politics from zero-sum into win-win game.

Reilly intends to achieve this goal by relating the institutional design and electoral system to the idea of centripetalism. The major idea of centripetalism is that political parties converge towards the center and tend to cooperate. Although in centripetal systems differences and conflicts exist, the outcome of conflicts needs not be irresolvable but ‘a part of broader coalition problem, a problem which potentially can be overcome by bargaining and reciprocal trade-offs.’ The electoral system that is based on centripetal idea can create ‘bargaining areas’ via which political and ethnic rival ‘come together to negotiate the vote-trading deals.’ The aim is to create the area for the emergence of the Downsian median voter. According to the model advanced by Anthony Downs, parties adjust ‘their policy platform to attract votes from this group, so that electoral competition becomes a fight for the moderate center.’ Ethnically divided societies do not conform to this model since voters always vote for the political parties of their ethnic origin. ‘With no median voters, competition for votes takes place at the extremes rather then at the center.’ The whole catch is to try to design electoral rules so that they give incentives to voters sometimes to vote for parties or candidates that do not come from the political party of the same ethnic origin. If electoral system is designed to push candidates to look for support from other ethnic groups, the candidates will tend to become more moderate and more accommodative over the hottest issues. This will naturally push candidates towards the center. Reilly uses the term centripetalism to describe ‘a political system or strategy designed to focus competition at the moderate center rather than at the extremes.’

A centripetal system has three distinct elements: a) electoral incentives, which makes candidates reach out for voters from ethnic group other than their own; b) areas of bargaining, which makes actors come together and find solution face to face; c) centrist, aggregative political parties or coalitions, which seek multiethnic support.

What kind of electoral system is best suited to ethnically divided societies? Reilly considers three types: a) majoritarian; b) semi-
proportional; and c) proportional system. Some variants of pure majoritarian electoral systems (such as ‘first past the post’, ‘block vote’, and ‘two round’ or ‘run-off’ system) can be written off, as these systems by no means can contribute to solving ethnic tension but rather to their aggravation. They lie on ‘winner takes it all’ logic, which is precisely the logic that presents the major obstacle to the politics of accommodation in divided societies.

There are three types of electoral systems Reilly considers for ethnically divided societies. All are preferential in nature. The first is alternative vote (AV), which is a kind of majoritarian system. It implies the ranking of the candidates, which enables voters to express their preferences in order after the first choice has been made. If no candidate wins the majority, the one who got the least number of first choices is eliminated. This system was used in Australia, Fiji and Papua New Guinea. The second system is supplementary vote (SV). This system implies that voters again rank their preferences but if no clear winner emerges, all candidates are eliminated bar the first two on the list. They get the rest of the votes, and then the winner is to be chosen among them. The single transferable vote (STV) is applied in multimember districts. After candidates are ranked (as in the AV), the quota is to be established. A candidate who got more first preference votes than the quote requires is elected. If no clear winner is found, the candidate who got the least number of first preferences is eliminated, and her votes are distributed to those who are still in the game.

Whereas AV and SV may work as majoritarian systems, since they require the candidates to collect absolute majority of the votes, STV implies proportional representation. However, all three types are united in implying preferential voting. Preferential electoral systems make electorate not only to express their first choice, but second, third, and so on. It makes candidates to reach out of their ethnic constituencies and compete for votes from other ethnic groups. Its major advantage for divided societies is that it enables smaller minorities to be represented in the parliament, because it ‘enables electors to indicate how they would vote if their favored candidate is defeated and they had to choose between those remaining.’

The outcome of this kind of electoral system is centripetal democracy. This type of democracy is determined by an institutional arrangement that makes actors of different ethnic origins cooperate and bargain the future political deals. It is wrong, however, to assume that the major rival of centripetal democracy is majoritarian democracy. Its major rival is actually consociational democracy as defined by Arend Lijphart. The major feature of this model consists in the ability to develop institutional arrangements for elite power sharing. This model works fine in the Netherlands, Belgium or Switzerland, but it essentially freezes the existing cleavages within the society. As said, the centripetal model attempts to
transform the strategy of political actors into a more moderate one. According to this model, ‘the best way to mitigate destructive effects of ethnicity in divided societies is not simply to replicate existing ethnic divisions but rather to utilize electoral systems which encourage cooperation and accommodation between rival groups, and therefore to breakdown the salience of ethnicity rather than foster its representation in the parliament.’ Preferential systems dismantle the political force of ethnicity ‘by enabling electors to rank candidates in the order of choice on the ballot [which] provide parties and candidates in divided societies with an incentive to “pool votes” via the exchange of preferences between their supporters.’ After the elections politicians will, instead of relaxing, have to reach out and consider coalitions with other ethnic groups.

Except for particular distribution of votes, the centripetal effects are best achieved by drawing borders of electoral units. How this system works in practice can be seen, for example, from the Nigerian context. There the electoral system required that presidential candidate is elected only if he garners the support in all electoral units, namely from different regions. In Lebanon, for example, ethnic politics was watered down by requiring from electoral lists to be ethnically mixed, thereby making voters make up their minds on issue other than ethnicity.

In ethnically divided societies, preferential voting can give rise to more moderate politics. The cases of Estonia and Northern Ireland are instructive here. STV was applied in Estonia in the 1990 elections. Estonian population is 60% made of Estonians and 35% of Russians. Although on the first elections Estonians voted overwhelmingly for the Estonian parties and Russians for the Russian ones, some research showed that the STV system encouraged the creation of the aggregative multiethnic party system that narrowed the room for political parties to pursue strictly ethnic policies. The Northern Ireland case is even more telling. STV was applied in the 1973 and 1982 elections but gave almost no results in dismantling ethnic politics. However, it gave birth to tangible results when it was applied in 1998 after the ‘Good Friday’ agreement was signed. The analysts concluded that one of the reasons why the agreement endured laid in the fact that the assembly that was elected after its implementation was elected on the STV electoral system. It should be stressed that, although voter-transfer system can create moderate politics in ethnically divided societies, this can hardly be possible in the circumstances in which there are no moderate political groups that will naturally support the institutions that cement moderate system. ‘Centripetalism depends in part on assumption that there is sufficient moderate sentiments within a divided community for cross-voting deals to be possible.[...] But it cannot invent moderation where none exists.’
This explains why STV did not work in Northern Ireland in 1973 and 1982, but did in 1998. When the structure of the actors changed, the institutions that are more in favor of centripetal politics were embraced and, in turn, affected the party system and the politics of Northern Ireland. This brings us back to the question broached in the beginning of this review. Institutions indeed can do a lot to affect actors’ behavior. However, where actors simply wish to sidestep institutions, there is no way to make them abide by them.

As said, this book is intent on having both theoretical and practical relevance. Its content could be studied in the context of Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans where there are many countries that are ethnically heterogeneous. However, the number of cases where STV was applied and generated democratic behavior of the actor seems to be meager. AV was so far applied only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it failed to yield results because the second and the third choice, which is the requirement of the AV system, was allowed to be made only if the choice was some one from the same ethnic group.

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The Kosovo War had led to intense public and scientific debates. In the last three years a large number of literature on the political, legal, ethic, media-related, military-strategic and economic aspects of the conflict has emerged. The Kosovo Dilemma attempts to address all these issues in one volume. Each editor has already contributed to the similar book "Der Kosovo-Krieg" [The Kosovo War] [1], also edited by Ulrich Albrecht and Paul Schäfer. Whereas the first book was hastily written in 1999 and thus heavily influenced by strong public debates in Germany, the Kosovo Dilemma is a more reflective approach to investigate the broader implications of the conflict and the global contexts in which the it took place.

In the introduction the editors explain the Kosovo Dilemma which covers several intertwined problems: Globalisation processes and weakened nation states enable local actors to acquire rapidly weapons, fighters and money world-wide. So called "liberation armies" use ethnic, social or ideological arguments to hide their material interests. This leads to the phenomenon of New Wars. The international community has tried to end some of these New Wars via military intervention. However, given the experience in Kosovo such a strategy may not be as effective as intended. After
The Kosovo War the International Community had to face the lack of state institutions in Kosovo and failed to establish working multiethnic, democratic and economic structures.

The first chapter by Dusan Reljic describes the current situation in Serbia after Milosevic. Criticising the interpretation of the CSCE principles and the outcomes of Washington-led interventions in the former Yugoslavia ("Not borders, but people, were moved with low prospect of restoring the pre war situation", p. 18), Reljic locates a shift from Pax americana to Pax europaeica. He sees the following main challenges for the future development of Serbia in the absence of the rule of law, corruption and the disputes between Kostunica and Djindjic, as well as between Serbia and Montenegro. Such problems make him question whether Serbia could meet all criteria for possible EU accession - even in the far future.

Wolfgang Oschlies focuses on Macedonia’s predicament between "minority protection, terrorism and state monopoly of power" (p. 31). He describes the "demographic battlefield" in Macedonia and the role of minorities in the education sector. His explanations are quite biased towards the Macedonian mainstream. For example, he assumes that the Albanian population will constitute the majority in Macedonia in some decades, which would explain the "panic fear" of the Macedonians to become extinct in their own country (p. 37). He criticises the "extremely disloyal, separatist position" (p. 36) of Albanians in Macedonia, who refused to participate in the referendum on independence and the constitution, as well the national census. While their refusal may be criticised, Oschlies should have also dealt with the cause of the discomfort by the Albanian population towards such participation. The "demographic battle" was and is fought on two sides: Whereas the Albanians tend to overstate their number, Macedonians often tend to do the opposite. Oschlies presents an overly positive picture of the Macedonian education system. He primarily explains the poor showing of minorities in elementary education by the inadequate enforcement of the compulsory school attendance and the aversion for female education among minorities (p. 39). Oschlies is right in stating that the complete failure of the international community to disarm the former KLA fighters, establish rule of law and control the borders of Kosovo was the main reason for the outbreak of the conflict in 2001. However, he overestimates the ability of the Macedonian security forces and politicians to have resolved the conflict on their own. The conflict was indeed a result of the failure of the international community, yet it was the international community and their envoys that offered the way out, taking on the ungrateful - and sometimes hypocritical - job of bringing together directly or indirectly all conflict parties.

Sabine Riedel offers an outstanding analysis of the problems arising from states based on the principle of ethnicity. She argues that the concept of ethnicity has changed several times since the 19.th century and
has proven too unstable to provide the foundation for a functioning state. The concept of ethnicity has also the disadvantage that minorities may be abused by their "mother countries" whereby the power of the patronage country is increased and minorities restricted to their minority identity. Referring to Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia, she elucidates that the emphasis on ethnicity via constitution and parallel education systems fosters the fragmentation of the countries, a process unintentionally promoted by the EU. Considering that EU enlargement might create new problems with minorities, as is the case in Hungary, she proposes that concept of ethnicity be replaced by that of political nationhood (p. 59).

The articles of Michael Kalman, Kurt Hübner and Peter Scherrer deal with the relations of state and economy. Many states of Southeastern Europe are to weak to provide basic state services like border control or social security. Another serious problem is the dominance of the grey economy. According to the authors, these problems are partly due to the economic backwardness of the region and widespread corruption, but they are also a result of neoliberal globalisation and the politics of the IMF and the Stability Pact. The latter overstressed development of infrastructure and small enterprises, whereas the promotion of the social sector was not included in the Quick Start Projects (pp. 102-105). The three articles are very broad in nature and the connections between globalisation processes, international organisations and their impact on Southeastern Europe could have been discussed in greater detail. In her article "How clean are New Wars?" Jasmine Bachmann (Worldwide Fund for Nature) questions the effects of the NATO bombing campaign on the environment and health. She investigates the bombing of industrial plants, like in Novi Sad and Pancevo, that have the features of a de facto chemical warfare. She concludes that the air campaign could lead to serious long term ecological problems not only for Yugoslavia, but for all of Southeastern Europe.

One of the main shortcomings of the book is the selection of case studies, which are often not related to the Kosovo. Burkhard Luber gives a personal perspective on the problems of NGO work related to reconciliation in Eastern Slavonia. It is unclear why Eastern Slavonia has been chosen rather than an example from the Kosovo, when countless NGOs are working in this field. Similarly, Hans-Christof von Sponeck's contribution on the negative effects of sanctions on Iraq seems unrelated to the topic of the book. It might have been more informative to discuss the (in)effectiveness of sanctions on the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia. The article of Astrid Nissen and Katrin Radtke concerns warlords as new actors in international relations. They offer short case studies on Liberia and Lebanon, although the Kosovo-related conflicts alone would have offered enough material for this topic. They define warlord figures as "precarious political groups violently acting in contemporary
wars” using international connections (p. 143). It is not convincing why this definition can be applied to Hashim Thaci (pp. 150ff) but not to Zeljko Raznatovic aka Arkan (p. 143).

Peter Lock’s article focuses on high tech wars in the 21st century. He deals with the influence of the military industrial complex in the USA and raises important questions concerning the financial costs of the military campaign and the actual achieved outcome during the Kosovo War. According to Lock, the "humanitarian intervention" was merely the pretext in order to set a precedent for future military intervention without the UN. US military actions must always be supported by broad political and not military coalitions. Yugoslavia did not capitulate after some days of air strikes as was expected by the USA (pp. 131-137). Nevertheless, the "imperial aim of disciplining" Yugoslavia in order to force it into the "regime of liberal globalism" (p. 137) was reached. Thus, the protection or implementation of "liberal globalism" is the main motivation for the military actions of the USA. Lock does not even consider that the experience from the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the (miscalculated) intention to prevent another war and refugee crisis might have also played a role. The question of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention also plays a role in Hans-Joachim Heintze’s contribution. He concludes that international law has serious flaws regarding international interventions, which often occur in legal grey areas. On account of the difficulty to amend international laws he pleas for a more effective work by the UN, which could be reached by a more active civil society and critical public.

The final two articles by Ernst Schulte-Holtey and Paul Schäfer investigate the role of media and public debates during and after the Kosovo War. Analysing the use of symbols, Schulte-Holtey states that those who supported the war were characterised as "grown up", "responsible" and able to act morally, whereas those with other opinion were presented as "sick", "disabled" and "left pacifists" (p. 185). The German media coverage of the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the Kosovo War in particular was often very inadequate, oversimplified and stereotypical, yet more complex than Schulte-Holtey suggests. And neither the supporters nor the opponents of the Kosovo war were generally characterised in such a way. Schäfer complains strongly about the missing debate on German foreign policy, the partiality of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and prevailing paradigms of capitalist globalisation, democracy, market economy and military interventions. He raises many questions and demands alternatives though he does not offer any alternative solutions.

In this respect the whole book fails. The editors claim to offer analysis and policy advising suggestions that can be understood as elements for a policy change (p.15). However, proposals like the necessity to "overcome the
antagonism of concurring globalisation processes” by the “modification of liberal globalism” (p. 139) are formulated a bit too vaguely. The contributions are very diverse and address an overwhelming variety issues. Therefore, it would have been more accurate to speak of Kosovo Dilemmas. It may have also been better to focus on fewer topics and to elaborate how the Kosovo case is connected to global phenomenon like weak states and new wars. The book raises many important and uncomfortable questions, but it does not take the extra step to offer concrete answers which could be used for a constructive debate on the solution of the Kosovo Dilemma(s).


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Almost seven years after the ratification of the Dayton Peace Agreement Bosnian voters have favored the three nationalist parties over moderate forces in the recent elections. The debate on the future of the Bosnian state has gained new currency as the critics of the Dayton Peace Agreement as well as the international involvement in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina seem to have been confirmed by the results. One place where issues of peacemaking and democratization have been discussed over the last years is the Bosnian Institute for Strengthening Democracy in Konjic. Some of the papers from the 1998/99 seminars have been edited in the book under review. The book makes a strong plea for the preservation of the Bosnian state as well as for continued international commitment.

This is best presented in the articles written by Daniel Kofman, Florian Bieber, Fionnuala Ni Aolain and Džemal Sokolovic. In “Self-determination in a Multiethnic State: Bosnians, Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs” Kofman defends the right of the Bosnians to secede from Yugoslavia in 1992 whereas he denies the same right to the entities created by the Dayton Agreement. He argues that the principle of *uti possidetis* in international law “establishes strict rules in secessions precisely to avoid recursive extravaganzas” (38), and underlines the importance of creating checks and balances for leftover minorities. While his argument is convincing from a legal point of view, Kofman fails to fully account for the underlying social and economic dynamics that have lead to the break-up of former Yugoslavia, which was precisely the argument put forth by authors Sokolovic, Dzemal & Florian Bieber (eds), *Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, 224 pp., ISBN 0 7546 1485 9 (hardcover) 39.95 GBP.
such as Susan Wood ward whom he dismisses as pro Serbian.

The longstanding Western mistrust against the accommodation of national group rights is further discussed by Florian Bieber in his article: “The challenge of Democracy in Divided Societies: Lessons from Bosnia - Challenges for Kosovo”. Bieber’s point of departure is that the West has to “discard the hope of “solving” nationalism” (109) and instead address the challenges that plural societies pose to democratic theory. In comparing the Dayton and Rambouillet Agreements he concludes that both lack the necessary institutional tools for developing multinational societies. Instead, they exacerbate existing cleavages (Dayton more so than Rambouillet). In order to develop a system where individual and group rights are respected Bieber makes some basic suggestions, e.g. to develop “instruments for inter-group co-operation on multiple levels of society and a clear system of incentives for groups to cooperate” (118/119).

Fionnuala Ni Aolain takes a closer and critical look at the “fractured soul” (63) of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Starting from the premise that the restoration of legality is essential to the revitalization of Bosnian civil society, Aolain analyses especially the constitutional arrangements for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Like other authors of the book she proposes to regard Dayton as a transitional framework and to pay more respect to Bosnia’s legal culture before the war. Here, the international community plays a crucial role, which, according to Aolian, should refrain from paternalism and allow for a more flexible interpretation of the Dayton Agreement. Aolian’s discussion of the Bosnian constitution can be compared with the analysis of the Belgian constitution by Richard Lewis in the same book. According to Lewis, the Belgian model has the capacity to ‘identify interests before conflict emerges’ (132). While he is not advocating the transfer of this model, he draws attention to the importance of clear constitutional agreements.

Looking also at legal aspects but through the sociological lens Dzemal Sokolovic is more explicit in his critique on the ambiguities of the international involvement. While he gives ample evidence for the “rule of unjust laws” (97) under the Dayton Agreement, Sokolovic demands an “educational protectorate by the international community” (104). This should not be understood as a reinforcement of paternalism but as a basis for the moral restoration of Bosnian society. An “educational protectorate” would end the “illusion of sovereignty” and “create assumptions that will enable Bosnia to carry on living as a country in which its own people, and not national groups or their parties, will be the carriers of sovereignty.” (106). Sokolovic is not very concerned about international relations that are arguably more guided by interests than morality yet his view on Bosnia-Herzegovina’s present and future is none the less very stimulating.
The book includes two other highly original articles that deal with questions of legal procedures and democracy which are relevant to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both start from the assumption that procedural democracy is not enough, that it can even have very undemocratic outcomes. In his article “The Injustice of Procedural Democracy” Thomas William Simon discusses several democratic procedures such as voting and majority rule that have neither prevented Hitler’s raise to power nor violent conflict in former Yugoslavia or other parts of Eastern Europe. Simon’s major contribution to the book is that he includes the concept of socio-economic justice in his analysis. According to him, international attempts to democratize Bosnia-Herzegovina has been largely a failure “because of the lack of resources devoted to and effectively targeted at rebuilding” (17). Peter Emerson in his article on the Quota Borda System of Elections (QBS, proposed by the French Jean-Charles de Borda in 1770) deals with one specific procedure of democracy, that is voting. His main argument is that the “expression of “free and fair” applies more to the conduct of the election rather than to the electoral system” (155). According to Emerson, the QBS appeals especially in a context such as Bosnia-Herzegovina since it gives the voter more than one choice. The quota system which would be applied to all three levels (presidential, parliamentary, local elections) will ensure fair representation of any constituency, party or other group.

Although the book deals primarily with institutional and legal matters, it also contains topics such as the return of refugees and displaced people, the ambiguous belonging of Bosnian refugee women in Germany, the role of NGOs in rebuilding civil society, journalism and the restructuring of regions. Those are all important aspects in the process of reconstructing a multiethnic civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, the editors have arranged the articles in two parts which are not very helpful in linking the different issues. Having said this, the book is nevertheless a very thought provoking contribution to an ongoing debate. Everybody who felt intrigued by the outcome of the latest election in Bosnia-Herzegovina will find important answers in it.

Note: The co-editor of this volume is also a co-editor of Southeast European Politics.

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The relationships between nationalism, religion, and violence have been extensively explored over the course of the last few decades (see Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith, Ernest Gellner, et
al.). Utilizing a variety of approaches, scholars have attempted to describe how these elements relate to one another to induce people to violence, or, why nationalism persists as a useful category of identity. Christopher Catherwood has revised and updated his 1997 *Why the Nations Rage: Killing in the Name of God* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002) to reflect new developments in the Balkans and, more importantly to him, the post-11 September world. Unfortunately, in spite of his good intentions, this volume does not deliver any new information, is full of factual and logical errors, and frequently fails to address new scholarship on religion or Balkan studies. The author seems to have become so preoccupied by the attacks of September 2001 as to neglect the original impetus for the volume, the role of religion in inspiring or permitting nationalist violence in the former Yugoslavia.

The book is organized with eleven short chapters that, while interconnected in a general sense, can be read independently. Three of the eleven primarily focus on the causes and aftermath of 11 September. Elsewhere the author examines Church-State relations in Greece, the possibility of religious pluralism in post-communist Romania, and nationalist literature in Yugoslavia. Catherwood attempts to show how the legacy of Byzantine caeseropapism can inform discussions of Milosevic’s Serbia. Further, Catherwood makes a great effort to connect the more theoretical works of scholars as Benedict Anderson or Anthony Smith to the concrete realities of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. Typically volumes are (unfairly) categorized to the extent they are theoretical or contain case studies. Catherwood attempts to overcome this dichotomy in applying a variety of theoretical models to explain a wide range of instances of religion intersecting with nationalist ambitions.

Unfortunately, the execution is found wanting in a number of areas. First, the author neglects a wide range of recent and not-so-recent literature that may strengthen or inform his arguments. For example, his discussion of Romania fails to mention the work of Katherine Verdery. Her *Political Lives of Dead Bodies* would certainly support parts of his discussion of the tension between the Uniate and Orthodox Churches. Elsewhere he fails to account for the work of Victor Friedman on linguistics and nationalism, Tone Brinda on Islam in Bosnia, or Maria Todorova on the ambiguous position of the Balkans vis a vis the West. Instead, Catherwood favors more journalistically inclined writers such as Michael Ignatieff or Misha Glenny and cites recent news articles in his discussions of al-Qa’ida and Osama Bin Laden. Finally, although the author does mention *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, a great volume on literature and culture in Yugoslavia, Catherwood refers to the author as Andrew Baruch Westel instead of the correct Andrew Baruch Wachtel.

Although interesting, his sections on Greece and Romania fail to contribute much to the larger issue of violence as there
has been little-to-no violence predicated on religious grounds in these countries (certainly not to the scale as was seen in Yugoslavia). His juxtaposition of accounts of the situations in these countries next to Osama Bin Laden is certainly misleading. Further, his account of the role of *millet* system is superficial, although he does point out the degree to which Greek Orthodox religious officials would be complicit in the organization and administration of the Ottoman Empire.

Catherwood felt compelled to account for the events of 11 September in the revision of his original volume and the results are best described as mixed. On page 69, the translation used indicates that the Arabic term *umma* means “Islamic nation” and/or “nation of Islam.” Unfortunately, while the term “nation” here may support Catherwood’s interest in the role of religion in forming a national identity, the translation is flawed. In general *umma* refers to the “worldwide community of believers,” not necessarily in the form of a nation as used elsewhere by Catherwood. His treatment of Bin Laden and Islamism is flawed in other areas. Catherwood notes the distinction between Shi’a and Sunni Islam throughout, but fails to mention any distinctions on the part of Wahhabism (155). Towards the end, he proposes that Islam needs a Reformation akin to that experienced by Christianity. Once again, his lack of knowledge of recent scholarship is betrayed in failing to note the work of Dale Eickelman, and anthropologist of the Middle East, who has argued that such a transformation is, in fact, underway (see Eickelman’s Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs at http://www.fpri.org/fpriwire/0709.199908.eickelman.muslimtransfor m.html).

Finally the book stumbles with factual and argumentative errors throughout. While I do not wish to provide a full catalog, a few representative ones are noted here. The author attributes Papal Infallibility as being formally adopted in the nineteenth century, when in fact it was the nineteenth during the First Vatican Council (114). His description of the situation leading to the Treaty of Lausanne is quite inadequate (153), neglecting to note that Atatürk reorganized Anatolia into the Turkish Republic in the wake of the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. That it was a so-called “vanquished state” is not entirely accurate in that it certainly vanquished the attempts of the Greek state to gain territory at the expense of Turkey. At times the author seems to contradict himself methodologically. On the one hand he is quite right in denying the veracity that the current problems between Europe and Islam are an age-old phenomenon (see page 141), yet, he is also willing to take the long view, noting that Islamic conquest of Spain in 711 was the beginning of tensions (111). One either subscribes to the ancient hatreds, or the clash of civilizations thesis, or one does not. Inconsistent use of methods and a failure to define key terms such as religion, nation, or even “East” versus “West” plagues the book and detracts
from the potentially positive contributions the author can make. This book is unable to contribute much to the discussion on the interlocking relationships between religion, nationalism, and violence at a time when there is a great need for better analysis. This is due to the numerous logical and factual mistakes, a lack of awareness of new work in the various fields, and the fundamental failure to connect the occasionally discordant elements into a single, coherent thesis. On the other hand, his comparative approach, and willingness to examine seemingly disconnected issues such as religious freedom in contemporary Greece or identity politics in Yugoslavia, is to be admired and used as a potential starting point for future work.

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