

The Aftermath of the Annan Plan Referendums: Cross-voting Moderation for Cyprus?¹

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ABSTRACT

This article examines recent developments in the Cyprus negotiations and suggests a number of changes to the proposed electoral system. Specifically, cross-voting and other electoral methods that encourage coalition-building across ethnic communities might add significantly to the functionality of the Annan Plan. Combined with other innovative mechanisms already in the plan, cross-voting could force political parties to seriously take into account the interests and concerns of the two Cypriot communities, an element that is currently missing from both the Turkish Cypriot (TC) and Greek Cypriot (GC) political systems. Special conditions on the island, as well as the way most political parties operated in the critical pre-April 2004 referendum period, suggest the need for this amendment. Although this study respects the consociational logic of the Annan Plan, it supplements consociationalism with elements that foster integration and inter-dependence between the two communities and their voters. The article also reviews the post-referendum developments in Cyprus which might have worrisome future implications, not only for its two communities, but also for EU enlargement in general. Cyprus both holds one of the keys to Turkey's entrance into the EU and is a litmus test for the Euro-Atlantic nexus and its capacity to pacify and integrate ethnically divided societies in Europe and elsewhere.

Introduction

Although proposals for cross-voting are not new, discussion of the advantages of this electoral device figured prominently in three conferences on Cyprus that took place in the final months of 2003.³ Scholars and activists from the region and elsewhere suggested the need for this arrangement (Rotberg, 2003; Anastasakis, Bertrand, Nicolaides, 2004).⁴ In his report on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, S/2003/398, the Secretary-General of the UN also endorsed the concept of cross-voting in Cyprus, even though he eventually opted to exclude it from the plan (Annan: 19). The Greek Cypriot

rejection of the plan at the April 24, 2004 referendum (a stunning 76 percent; Economist 2004) disappointed international and local actors interested in a viable settlement for the island, and necessitated a search for new mutually-beneficial formulae regarding security, demographic, and electoral issues. Cross-voting is such a formula.⁵ Not only can cross-voting be introduced as a “win-win” arrangement without distorting the current balance of the Annan Plan, it can also help increase the likelihood for a mutually agreed solution as well as facilitate future improvements in the political system of a re-united Cyprus.

Background of the Annan Plan Negotiations

EU engagement in Cyprus has been based on the expectation that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, on the one hand, and Greece and the Greek Cypriots on the other, would cooperate in reaching a settlement, without one side being held hostage by the intransigence of the other. Although it was extremely important, a settlement was not a precondition for admitting Cyprus into the EU, especially if Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots blocked the UN Secretary General’s efforts to broker an agreement (Loizides 2002). Thus, Cypriot membership in the EU came as no surprise, particularly in light of the fact that all mediators attributed the November 2001-March 2003 deadlocks exclusively to the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş, and Turkey (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2003; Economist 2003; Wesseligh, 2003; Evans-Pritchard, 2003).⁶ As was generally agreed upon, the Greek Cypriot side could not be held hostage because of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot intransigence during the negotiations, and therefore the whole island was admitted into the EU, albeit represented only by the Greek Cypriots.

Yet by spring 2004, a major shift had occurred in the foreign policies of the two sides. It was now Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots—not Greece and the Greek Cypriots—that supported the Annan Plan. Having assured their accession to the EU, the Greek Cypriots no longer had a pressing need to demonstrate a cooperative attitude towards the plan, especially after the pro-deal Clerides government lost power in early 2003. In contrast, Turkey needed proof of its good will in order to rally support for its EU membership, particularly before the crucial December 2004 deadline. Moreover, by spring 2004, Turkish PM Tayyip Erdoğan seemed to have achieved a decisive influence within his government, the parliament, and other decision-making centers in Turkey. In addition, as Turkey could only win by saying “yes” as a Greek Cypriot “no” became inevitable, Erdoğan could now easily “free-ride” on Greek Cypriot leader Papadopoulos’ evident “intransigence.”⁷ Finally, successful pro-settlement mobilization in the North led to the political isolation of veteran Turkish leader Rauf Denktaş, reducing the effect of his call for a “no” vote.

But this switch in positions was not without consequences. In his campaign against the plan, Papadopoulos urged Greek Cypriots to respond with a resounding “no” to the plan (Agence France Presse 2004), thereby unleashing an unprecedented wave of nationalism in the island. The pro-government camp argued that the plan was unfair and dysfunctional, with Papadopoulos and his allies going so far as to brand “yes” supporters

traitors.⁸ For their part, the “yes” supporters now question Papadopoulos’ judgment, credibility, and commitment to the settlement.⁹ For instance, Papadopoulos’ manipulation of the state bureaucracy and media against the plan is documented in a 2004 report published by the Cyprus Action Network entitled “Human rights violations in Cyprus in the days before the referendum.”¹⁰ Still, pro-government circles claim that the president had been a “fighter for democracy” during the 1974 junta coup and therefore could not be criticized by others.¹¹ The referendum led to a dangerous polarization among the Greek Cypriots, which has not faded in the half a year since the two communities cast their vote.

Moreover, political instability in Cyprus might dredge up tensions of the past, especially if Papadopoulos vetoes Turkey’s EU accession bid in the future. After becoming a full EU member on May 1, 2004, Cyprus (i.e. the Greek Cypriots) also earned a veto right over Turkey’s EU accession. In December 2004, Papadopoulos was reportedly very close to vetoing Turkey’s accession. He opted, however, to “postpone” this decision for later (Smith 2004). Papadopoulos, who has promised Greek Cypriots an improved settlement once Cyprus joins the EU, would be discredited without any gains from Turkey’s EU accession process. Yet Turkish PM Erdoğan believes he has already done his best by embracing the settlement that EU members have previously declared as both fair and functional (Boland 2004). This catch-22 situation necessitates the search for new and mutually-beneficial changes in the Annan Plan.

Obviously, besides satisfying the Greek Cypriots, any new formulae should have equal benefits for the Turkish Cypriots as their support of the plan cannot be taken for granted by international mediators. To begin with, many Turkish Cypriots feel victimized by the Greek Cypriot vote, which prevented them from joining the EU. They also regard the international community as having been too slow to support them financially and politically. This anger will most likely increase support for anti-deal forces. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot support of the plan—primarily the vote of illegal Turkish migrants—was facilitated by Erdoğan’s position, which, of course, might change in the future in accordance with Turkish national interests. Finally, many in the Turkish Cypriot community voted “yes” simply to gain international sympathy, assuming (correctly, as it turned out) that Greek Cypriots would reject the plan.¹² In the future, these forces may well think twice before voting in favor of the plan, particularly if next time, the Greek Cypriot leaders endorse the deal.

This article will deal with the electoral system proposed in the Annan Plan, with a view to suggesting and justifying viable alternatives or modifications. There is evidence that political parties in Cyprus do not pay attention to the other community’s interests and concerns; indeed, this element is sadly lacking in both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot political cultures. Notably, the two large leftist parties, Turkish Cypriot CTP (Turkish Republican Party) and Greek Cypriot AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People) have never managed to project a unified message, despite their hitherto amicable relationship at both grassroots and elite levels. Rather, they have made alliances with right-wing or “centrist” nationalists within their own communities, always at the expense of their own moderate

agenda.¹³ For instance, CTP's recent cooptation by Turkey, and its alliance with the Democratic Party (DP) of Serdar Denktaş, son of the veteran Turkish Cypriot leader, raised the fears and insecurities of the Greek Cypriots. Likewise, AKEL's support of Papadopoulos (and DIKO, Democratic Party), as well as its surprising rejection of the Annan Plan, alienated the party from the Turkish Cypriots.

Yet this scenario is not new. The moderate DISY leader Clerides aligned with DIKO in 1993 to topple the Boutros-Boutros Ghali scheme (Economist 1993). And in 1983, AKEL elected DIKO's founder Spyros Kyprianou as president; he then rejected the Perez de Cuellar Plan in January 1985 (Fisher 2001; Hadjipapas 1984; Howe, 1983). Moderates in the Turkish Cypriot community also participated in various coalition governments with nationalists, such as when the CTP joined forces with DP in the mid-1990s (*Agence France Presse* 1994). These examples suggest that a different electoral system is needed to change the pattern of alliances between political parties, to foster future cooperation between the moderate forces in the two communities, to offer moderates an alternative, and to reduce their dependence on anti-deal forces. We suggest that cross-voting meets this need, with minimal effect on the overall balance of the Annan Plan.

The Annan Plan and Cross-voting

According to the Annan Plan, in its future federal government Cyprus will have a Senate with a 50-50 composition, reflecting the political equality of the constituent states (or rather the two communities), and a Chamber of Deputies, reflecting the current majority Greek Cypriot population of the island (75-25); it can also change to reflect future demographic changes, if TCs increase their population share above 25 percent. Ordinary decisions in the Senate will require the majority assent of the Senators, including at least a quarter of the representatives from each constituent state. According to the revised March 28th version of the UN Plan for the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Issue, on issues of vital interests, such as the election of the Presidential Council, there should be a special majority of at least two fifths of the Senators from each side (2004: 9-10, 29).

To reduce Turkish Cypriot apprehensions about the resettlement of GCs under TC administration, the plan unlinks residency and voting rights at both federal and local level, leading to the partial disenfranchisement of many Greek and Turkish Cypriots.¹⁴ Thus, the members of each community will be voting *separately* for their representatives in the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, and other institutions of their constituent states. Cross-voting was excluded from this design, because during the negotiations, the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş, argued that this electoral mechanism was incompatible with "genuine" Turkish Cypriot representation.

Nonetheless, a careful examination of the features of cross-voting suggests that it does not contradict the consociational character of the Annan Plan. Cross-voting involves a member of one ethnic community voting for the other community's representatives, in addition to voting for his/her own (Reilly 2001; Horowitz 1991).¹⁵ The type and degree of influence one community will have on the elections of the other might vary depending on

the electoral system: this might be between 10 and 20 percent of the total of each community. In the case of Cyprus, cross-voting should have the same effect on each community, regardless of its relative size. For instance, even if all Turkish Cypriots were to vote in the GC federal elections, their vote might be adjusted to 10 percent of the total GC vote. The same percentage could be allocated for Greek Cypriots participating in TC elections. Cross-voting does *not* imply that Turkish Cypriot representatives will be voted in by a Greek Cypriot numerical majority, nor does it imply the subordination of one community to the other. For the most part, this percentage is not high enough to produce any unnecessary complications,¹⁶ or to cause opposition by one or more parties in the negotiations. At the same time, it is high enough to ensure that political parties will seriously take into account both communities' interests and concerns.

There are multiple ways to introduce cross-voting mechanisms. One is the introduction of a "transitory step"—with 5 or 15 percent as the cap to be reached once trust has been established between the two constituent states: this could be decided with a special majority in the Senate.¹⁷ Another suggestion is to use cross-voting as a second resort during potential Senate deadlocks. Where senators fail to reach an agreement to form a government, new elections could be held, with a higher degree of cross-voting from each community. This mechanism can be designed to prevent deadlocks in the upper house and force senators to show a cooperative attitude or risk being outvoted in subsequent elections. Finally, a third suggestion is to introduce some kind of cross-voting mechanism in the selection of supreme judges, which according to the plan also serve as power-brokers in settling political deadlocks. Moderate cross-appointed judges can be a better solution especially in comparison with appointing three non-Cypriots judges as suggested in the current plan.

But what is the justification for introducing cross-voting mechanisms? For the most part, cross-voting favors moderate candidates who have appeal beyond their ethnic communities, and therefore fosters coalitions across ethnic lines (Reilly 2001). In addition, cross-voting reduces "us vs. them" categories and offers space in the political system for individuals and movements that aim to represent the whole country rather than ethnically-specific interests. And last, but by no means least, cross-voting favors the emergence of civil society movements or political parties that contribute new ideas to the political discourse, not just of each community, but of the country as a whole.¹⁸

Cross-voting has already been featured in proposals for possible improvements to the current UN plan (Rotberg, 2003; Anastasakis, Bertrand, Nicolaides, 2004). It is noteworthy that three separate conferences that took place in the final months of 2003 at Harvard, Oxford, and Cornell, led to such suggestions independent of one another. The Harvard conference resulted in a report authored by Professor Robert Rotberg and entitled "Cyprus after Annan: Next Steps toward a Solution." Rotberg argues that cross-voting and other similar electoral methods encourage—if not mandate—coalition-building across ethnic and state lines. He describes this type of voting as beneficial for the Turkish Cypriots, arguing that cooperation across ethnic lines works to eliminate discrimination against numerical minorities (11).

Likewise, the authors of the Oxford report, entitled “Getting to Yes: Suggestions for Embellishment of the Annan Plan for Cyprus,” suggest that “cross-voting would potentially greatly contribute to enhancing the role of moderate factions in island politics and increasing the fluidity of the new political system on the island” (Anastasakis, Bertrand, Nicolaides 2004: 7). They go on to suggest that cross-voting is an idea that has been developed for many years by peace activists in the island. In a 2002 speech in the House of Commons, British MP Andrew Dismore emphasized the importance of the future electoral system of Cyprus and pointed out that without cross-voting, there is a risk that rejectionists on both sides could create problems, as in Northern Ireland (Dismore 2002). Last, at the Cornell conference, a leading expert on ethnic relations in the former Yugoslavia, Professor V.P. Gagnon of Ithaca College, stated that the absence of an electorate mechanism that ensures ethnic cooperation is a major factor in the current malfunctioning of the Bosnian political system.¹⁹

Putting Cross-voting into Practice

In this article, we suggest a system that balances the need for accountability to one’s community with incentives that appeal to the other community.²⁰ As can be seen in the examples below, if the two new formulae for cross-voting were adopted, no party would be able to increase its vote share by more than 10 percent of its respective community vote. For instance, a party that currently receives a thousand votes among the Turkish Cypriots could only increase these votes to a maximum of one thousand and one hundred. In this way, the formulae eliminate the possibility of having small GC or TC parties ostensibly “representing” their own community but actually being voted in exclusively by the other community, thereby creating a problem of “ethnic accountability.” Moreover, the formulae below favor as many alliances as possible by large parties and ideally could lead to all parties having the opportunity to make cross-community coalitions. They also prevent the GC or TC from voting as a block, since parties would only need to match their current community percentages in the other community’s vote in order to achieve the 10 percent electoral gain. Applied to the situation at hand, this means that in order to increase their votes by 10 percent, DIKO or AKEL, for instance, would require only a 15 or 35 percent increase, respectively, in the TC community. Any additional gains would not count.

A. According to the formula below, any GC party will get the following:

$$GC_{total} = GC \text{ community votes} + [(Turkish \text{ Cypriot community votes}) \times 5^{21}] \times (10/100)$$

GC_{total} refers to all votes a Greek Cypriot party gets in a given election. This is not equal to the actual number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots who vote for this party since their votes are scaled according to the proposed formula.

GC community vote refers to all Greek Cypriot votes a Greek Cypriot party receives in a given election.

Turkish Cypriot community votes refers to all Turkish Cypriot votes a Greek Cypriot party receives in a given election.

If (TC community votes)X 5 are more than the actual Greek Cypriot votes of a GC party, any additional votes will not count.

B. According to the formula below, any TC party will get the following:

$TC_{total} = TC \text{ community votes} + [(GC \text{ community votes}) / 5] \times (10/100)$

If (GC community votes)/ 5 are more than the actual Turkish Cypriot votes of a TC party these additional votes will not count.

TC_{total} refers to all votes a Turkish Cypriot party gets in a given election. This is not equal to the actual number of Turkish and Greek Cypriots who vote for this party since their votes are scaled according to the proposed formula.

TC community vote refers to all Turkish Cypriot votes a Turkish Cypriot party receives in a given election.

Greek Cypriot community votes refers to all Greek Cypriot votes a Turkish Cypriot party receives in a given election.

If (TC community votes)X 5 are more than the actual Greek Cypriot votes of a GC party, any additional votes will not count.

Finally, it is important to think of alternative formulae that limit cross-voting to certain groups in the two communities. For instance, voting in the TC elections might be limited to Greek Cypriot refugees residing and taxed in the North (that is, the Greek Cypriot percentage of the total Turkish Cypriot vote will be constituted exclusively of one or more of these groups). Likewise, voting in the GC elections might be limited to TC refugees, residents of the South, or those employed and taxed there. These arrangements could be made to satisfy as many groups as possible, while at the same time maintaining the balance of the Annan Plan. Limiting cross-voting to these categories can be justified in normative terms, because these groups will be the most vulnerable to the “excesses of power” in the other community and the ones most likely to be affected by the other community’s decisions.

Criticisms and Solutions

There are several critiques of these formulae that need to be mentioned and then addressed. First, one could argue that anti-deal Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots would not be treated electorally in a manifestly “fair” way.

Rigging the game against hard-liners may initially seem an excellent idea, but they will most likely see through this and act accordingly. The proposed formulae might not only increase their discontent at the proposed settlement but also legitimize their rejection, not to mention trigger a possible boycott of future elections. Even if one accepts the idea that “nationalists are always wrong,” one might have difficulty arguing that nationalists do not deserve to be treated in an electorally fair way. Moreover, critics could argue that cross-voting reduces ethnic accountability, and therefore violates the bizonal character of the settlement. Next, by definition, a system that favors moderation will not be attractive to leaders who have invested heavily in intransigent policies. For instance, it is expected that Greek Cypriots will not vote for Rauf Denktaş or his supporters, but rather for moderates such as Mehmet Ali Talat and Mustafa Akıncı. Certainly, nationalists do not like such “distortions” of the electoral mandate, and they oppose the idea of introducing cross-voting in the first place.²² And finally, given Turkish Cypriot opposition when the issue was last brought up in the negotiations, introducing this electoral device might minimize the chances of reaching a final settlement, thereby reducing what UN officials have called “the negotiability of the plan” (Rotberg, 2003: 12).

Surprisingly perhaps, cross-voting will benefit the Turkish Cypriot community to a much greater extent than it will the Greek Cypriot community. For instance, a major worry among pro-settlement Turkish Cypriots is the Chamber of Deputies, where Turkish Cypriot representation is only 25 percent under the current plan. TCs fear potential deadlocks if hawkish Greek Cypriot deputies come to dominate this institution. This is a fairly reasonable concern, given the political views expressed by many current GC parliamentarians over the last few years. Here, cross-voting will benefit primarily the interests of the Turkish Cypriot community. Additionally, cross-voting is a mechanism crucial to the protection of the human and social rights of those Turkish Cypriots employed in the future Greek Cypriot constituent state. A case in point is the treatment of Turkish Cypriots employed in the South, who currently enjoy only half of the salary of their Greek Cypriot colleagues and sometimes have no social security benefits (Dalides, Kountouri 2004).

A potential solution to the problem of ethnic accountability is to limit cross-voting to certain parts of the legislative system in order to ensure the advantages and minimize the obstacles. If not politically feasible for both houses, then cross-voting might be introduced in one of them, or in both, but with different weights.²³ Since the Senate represents the bizonal character of the state, cross-voting might be tried there at the lower level of 10 percent. This minor amendment would help minimize GC fears that hawkish TC representatives might block legislation sent to the Senate. Furthermore, the amendment could be linked to an equitable concession to the Turkish Cypriot side, and we would suggest a higher 20 percent cross-voting weight in the Chamber of Deputies in order to minimize comparable fears in the Turkish Cypriot community. For the most part, these amendments require only minor concessions while adding more sustainability to the institutions of a reunited Cyprus.

The idea of fairness is one that needs to be addressed in broader terms. As mentioned, the plan unlinks residency and voting rights at the federal level as well as local levels, leading to the effective disenfranchisement of many Greek and Turkish Cypriots. A Greek Cypriot born in the TC constituent state might not be able to vote in the Turkish Cypriot elections even after establishing permanent residency. Likewise, a Turkish Cypriot born in the GC constituent state might not be able to vote there, even if employed and taxed in the South. Instead of promoting the electoral separation of the two communities, our formula allows more people more rights by standardizing the influence of each community on the other. Our formula does so regardless of future demographic changes that might shift the balance of the settlement against one of the two communities. Therefore, cross-voting mechanisms can reduce the risks and uncertainties from a future settlement.

An additional criticism, not mentioned above, refers to the feasibility of any changes to the current Annan Plan. The more changes one party demands the higher the likelihood of not reaching a consensus. Yet, we believe that it is a fundamental interest for the international community to pay special attention to arrangements that make decision-making in ethnically-divided societies easier and self-enforceable. Arrangements such as cross-voting would not only foster future cooperation between the two communities but also minimize the need for future intervention in Cyprus. At a time when resources (i.e. peacekeepers, security personnel, and financial aid) are in great demand in many other places, the search for self-enforceable arrangements in divided societies such as those in Cyprus and the Balkans is more than necessary (Christia, forthcoming).

Conclusion

Although the current Annan Plan has many merits, some areas will require future amendments. For example, in the recent negotiations, mediators were asked to improve the plan in such areas as human rights, functionality, and security. Because of current political constraints and lack of trust, a “perfect” plan might not be achievable. Any agreed-upon plan, however satisfying, might in fact lead to future disagreements between the two sides. Those who reject the idea of re-unification emphasize worst-case scenarios and play up potential difficulties. We therefore suggest that as well as striving to achieve a better plan, the two sides should craft political institutions that would help solve future problems. Cross-voting, with its potential ability to deal with problems and anomalies, is one such institution.

But will the UN and the foreign mediators be in a position to apply this “win-win” arrangement? The situation is critical: Cyprus is a litmus test for the international community, and sets the standard for its arbitration efforts in other protracted conflicts, such as Israel/ Palestine, Kosovo, post-Saddam Iraq, and Sri Lanka. But changes could (and should) be made to improve the plan, as failure to do so will certainly lead to future escalations of conflict and controversy. The people of Cyprus should have the opportunity to vote for a plan that reflects their interests and needs. The failure to adopt a beneficial arrangement for the two Cypriot communities, or more generally,

the inability to deliver a desirable and sustainable settlement, will set an unfortunate precedent. The two leaderships on the island, Turkey, Greece, and the UN and other foreign mediators should pay heed.

Endnotes

- ¹ Costas Carras, who has suggested cross-voting for the island since the late 1970s, shared with us his experience lobbying on this issue. The authors would also like to thank Robert Rotberg, Brendan O'Leary, Florian Bieber, Maria Koinova, Mary Southcott, Turgut Durduran, Elizabeth Thompson, Roberto Belloni, Elvan Kayral-Morris, V.P. Gagnon and Zenon Severis for their insightful comments.
- ³ These are: a conference organized by the World Peace Foundation at Harvard, September 12-14, 2003; a workshop by St. Anthony's College at Oxford, October 3-4, 2003; and a forum organized by the European Studies Program at Cornell University, November 7-8, 2003.
- ⁴ See also Costas Carras, Personal Communication, March 03, 2004.
- ⁵ Our focus on cross-voting does not imply that mutually beneficial arrangements for the two communities cannot occur in other areas, such as human rights, security, demography, etc. However, our analysis suggests that both human rights and functionality issues will be more easily addressed in the long-term future if our suggestions are taken into consideration. For a study on demographic issues, see (Loizides, Antoniadis 2004).
- ⁶ The US House of Representatives voted unanimously (422-0) to express its "very strong regret" that Mr Denktash had rejected the Annan Plan, specifically the proposal for carrying out separate referendums, which ended up denying for Turkish Cypriots the opportunity to determine their future (M2 Presswire, 2003).
- ⁷ In a question by Neophytos Loizides posed to Mehmet Ali Birand during an informal discussion at Harvard organized by the Kokkalis Program, October 19, 2004, the leading Turkish journalist rejected the idea of "free-riding" by Turkey arguing that neither Turkish policymakers or foreign mediators knew Papadopoulos' reaction to the plan during the Lucerne negotiations in March 2004. What we are arguing here is not that Turkish policymakers were bluffing, on the contrary, we are inclined to believe that they had honest intentions while endorsing the Annan Plan. What is important, however, is the possible reaction of the military or nationalist circles in Turkey had Papadopoulos endorsed the plan. Mehmet Ali Birand admitted that Papadopoulos' stance in the latest negotiations made life for Erdoğan much easier. One should not forget that Rauf Denktaş's stance also allowed the Clerides administration to demobilize opposition against the plan and finally that Andreas Papandreou's and Spyros Kyprianou's anti-deal statements in the January 1985 negotiations, allowed Denktaş to accept the settlement with no final cost for him personally.
- ⁸ Papadopoulos called a group of "yes" supporters *nenekides*, which according to his critics means traitors (Psyllides, 2004). Nenekos was a revolutionary figure in the Greek War of Independence of 1821 who surrendered to the Ottoman Turks. Papadopoulos also accused his opponents of receiving money from foreign sources, including the UN (Politis, 2004b).
- ⁹ Critiques of President Papadopoulos' policies can be found in daily editorials of newspaper *Politis* and *Alithia*, as well as in the statements of the DISY (Democratic Rally) and EDY (United Democrats) parties.

- ¹⁰ The authors are members of the Cyprus Action Network and they contributed to the preparation of this report.
- ¹¹ Many pro-government commentators claim that current Papadopoulos critics resemble the 1974 coup participants (Pantelides 2004). Papadopoulos supporters provide no evidence for his actions against the Greek Junta. In fact, daily newspaper *Politis* accused Papadopoulos for collaborating with the Junta for anti-communist activities and for hiding during the coup (Politis, 2004a).
- ¹² At a conference entitled “An Appraisal of Europe: The EU’s impact on the conflict, rights and environment in Cyprus” organized by Intercollege in Nicosia on September 16-18, Professor Erol Kaymak raised this possibility and argued that the plan should not be modified to the extent that a second referendum will be needed in the north. Moreover, we suggest that one should contrast the percentages of the pro-settlement parties and the “yes” vote in the referendum, the latter being approximately 15 percent higher than the party total.
- ¹³ The Greek Cypriot Democratic Party or DIKO poses itself as a “centrist party” but in fact it should be classified as an extreme right-wing party. For one thing, since the mid-1980s, DIKO has not accepted any proposals for the Cyprus problem (unlike leftist AKEL or center-right DISY). And unlike any other major party, DIKO was the only party that uniformly (with no exceptions among its leaders) rejected the current Annan Plan. DIKO MPs have also engaged in anti-immigrant propaganda. For instance, Paphos MP Nicos Pittokopitis has gone as far as asking the government to dislocate “bad characters” from his hometown (Jansen 1999)
- ¹⁴ Greek Cypriots, for instance, will be voting in their own constituent state, where they have their first residency, while exercising the right of a second residency in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. They will be granted permanent residencies later on, but even then they will not be able to vote for senators.
- ¹⁵ Within the scope of our proposal, “cross-voting” refers to the members of one ethnic community voting for the representatives of the other, although cross-voting can also be used for intra-community elections between rival parties (i.e. AKEL voters voting for DISY MPs and vice versa).
- ¹⁶ For instance, there are critics who argue that the deterioration of the political conditions in Fiji might be related to the introduction of cross-voting mechanisms (Fraenkel, 2001).
- ¹⁷ Alternatively, the fluctuation of the vote weight from five to ten percent might be linked to other issues in order to help the two sides come closer to an agreement in other areas. For instance, scenario planning on the final numbers of the settlers and refugees might include linkages to the degree of cross-voting (Loizides, Antoniadis 2004).
- ¹⁸ For a discussion of the links between institutions and the generation of ideas see Homer-Dixon 2000.
- ¹⁹ Personal Communication with V.P. Gagnon on February 2/23/2004; see also Belloni, 2004.
- ²⁰ Another suggestion is to provide ballots with separate pan-Cypriot and reserved community seats. Unlike our model, this arrangement will not provide incentives to all politicians to seek votes beyond their communities. Its advantage is that it creates truly Cypriot representatives; its possible disadvantage is that these representatives might be few and isolated. For a discussion of this proposal, see Emerson, Tocci 2002:14.
- ²¹ Assuming the number of Greek Cypriots is five times that of Turkish Cypriots.
- ²² Yet one might argue that the naturalization of the settlers prescribed in the Annan Plan distorts the voting in favor of pro-Denkash parties and therefore, in

the case of Cyprus, cross-voting will have a balancing role, especially if the numbers of settlers exceed the Annan Plan quotas.

- ²³ For a comparable suggestion, see Emerson, Tocci 2002:15.

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