Explaining an Activist Military: Greece until 1975

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ABSTRACT

The paper aims at explaining the high degree of the military’s involvement in Greek politics in the 20th century. It argues that focusing either on Huntington’s “professionalization” thesis or the more sociological accounts of socio-economic development can hardly give an explanation for the Greek armed forces’ military interventions in political life in general, and the 1967 coup in particular. In contrast to such explanations, I suggest an approach based on the Greek armed forces’ “dual character” and the political environment of the post-war era. The army’s tendency to intervene should be viewed primarily as a result of two major factors: a) the co-existence of two antithetical syndromes in the self-perception of the officer corps, and b) the army’s identification with the monarchy and the political right after 1949 in the context of the Cold War.

For almost two centuries, since its formation as a modern state, Greece has suffered from a series of interventions by the armed forces in political life. Though these interventions were for the most part peaceful and executed at an elite level, thereby minimising the risk of wider social disruption, they nevertheless hampered the country’s progress towards the consolidation of civilian democratic rule. The so-called “Colonels’ junta” from 1967 to 1974 was the last example of intervention in the 20th century (Bermeo 1995: 444). Ever since, Greece has managed to consolidate its formerly fragile democracy: the new 1975 Constitution and subsequent legislation makes politicians solely responsible for decisions affecting national defence, assigning a secondary role to the chief of General Staff (Veremis 1982: 29). The old malaise of Greece, the politicisation of the army, has now been replaced with a “civilian culture” that rejects all forms of officer involvement in politics.

The primary objective of this paper is to explain military intervention in Greek politics. To do so, I will utilise Huntington’s “professionalization” thesis, as well as the “sociological” explanation, and apply both to the Greek case. The main argument is that none of these theses can adequately explain the high level of military involvement in Greek political life; what is suggested is an approach focusing on the specific constellation of forces that led to such high levels of the Army’s politicisation. This politicisation, and the consequent interventionist tendency, was the result of the armed forces’
identification with the political right and the monarchical forces after the Civil war of 1949, as well as the co-existence of two antithetical tendencies in the self-perception of the officer corps, the “pallikari” and “managerial” syndromes. The second and third part of this article will outline the historical trajectory of the army’s role in Greek political life and offer a brief exegesis for democratic consolidation after 1975. Finally, the conclusion will summarise the main argument.

Preconditions for military interventions

Although the armed forces may chose to play different roles once they have intervened in the political process—from simply assuring the replacement of the current civilian administration with one of their liking to the monopolisation of political power—whether they will in fact intervene or not seems to rely essentially on two different sets of variables (Ball, Peters 2000; Danopoulos 1983: 485).

On the one hand are the “inward-technical” factors. These are related to the internal mechanisms of the armed forces and the way they structure their operational capabilities. The first crucial factor in this process is the level of professionalization that the army has acquired. For the purposes of this paper, military professionalism will be defined as a set of characteristics that include the following: responsibility, based on a framework of an ethically-inspired code of conduct; specialised theoretical knowledge and professional expertise and “a high degree of corporateness deriving from common training and devotion to specific doctrines and customs” (Huntington 1957). Professionalization is very significant for the armed forces, as it can reveal differences in organisational patterns, which in turn may be closely correlated to the army’s ambition to intervene in political affairs (Ball, Peters 2000: 267).

Aside from levels of professionalism, a series of closely linked factors are also crucial. The degree of specialization affects how the army relates to the government and whether it is capable of retaining its autonomy from the state. The educational and social background of the officer corps also may be influential. It has been suggested that when the composition of the armed forces reflects a large spectrum of society and is not drawn exclusively from one, usually elitist, social background, the chances of an “active” military involvement in political affairs are reduced (Mouzelis 2003).

The second variable relates to “outward-historic” factors. These are correlated to the mode and extent of the state’s socio-economic development. For instance, it is often suggested that early industrialization is negatively correlated to military intervention. The increased prestige the state enjoys in conditions of relative economic prosperity and the expansion of a middle class that sees itself as the primary beneficiary, and therefore the main supporter, of civilian rule hinder the chances of military involvement in the political process and preclude the portrayal of democratic politics as a corrupt and inefficient operation by the armed forces.
**The Greek Army as a case in point**

The “outward-historical” variable suggests that conditions in Greece favoured military intervention in politics for much of its history. Industrialization came to Greece only in the post-war period and became properly embedded in the country’s changing socio-economic landscape during the 1950s. Until then, the country’s main source of economic growth came from the agricultural sector, and it was only when western capital was invested in the country after the second World War that signs of economic modernization (such as the creation of industrial conglomerates, rapid urbanization, and so on) took hold (Kourvetaris 1971: 1053). By the 1950s, a sizable middle class had been formed and was increasingly involved in the political process. Therefore, the army’s influence in politics would have been expected to gradually diminish. However, the army intervened in 1967 and remained active in political life until 1975.

In terms of the army’s professionalization, the picture is somehow more complicated and does not appear to verify Huntington’s professionalization thesis. In the early 1900s, a time of political and social turmoil caused by the country’s geographic expansion and low levels of economic welfare, the armed forces’ levels of professionalism, specialisation, and military ethos—all of which distinguished them from the rest of society’s interest groups—were very low. By contrast, by the late 1950s, all the ingredients for a fully professional army were in place. As a result of its NATO membership in 1952, Greece had undertaken the obligation of reaching a level of military competence that would make it a reliable partner in the western alliance (Hatzivassiliou 1995: 187-202). This process was already under way before 1952 but the need to conform to NATO’s requirements accelerated its completion. The Evelpidon Officers Candidate School (Sholi Evelpidwn) offered both specialised and general courses, designed to enhance the levels of general knowledge as well as the expertise of the Army’s new recruits. At the same time, the selection process for the officer corps remained relatively open (as it had been before 1952), with new recruits coming from variety of social backgrounds. Consequently, despite a social and political atmosphere in post-1949 Greece that created a “limited democratic” regime, progressive and reform-minded officers continued to staff part of the armed forces.

Yet, despite professionalization and specialised expertise, the military did intervene in 1967 and retained power for the next seven years. It therefore appears useful to go beyond these two variables and examine the concrete and very particular case of the Greek Army as well as the specific conditions under which it intervened in 1967. If we do so, it appears that the army’s predisposition to intervene up until 1975 resulted from a combination of the army’s “dual” character and the socio-political uproar originating from outside forces (the Cold War environment) and domestic factors (the army’s complete identification with the monarchy and the political right).
The dualist nature of the armed forces

As mentioned before, the self-image of the armed forces is important in understanding the willingness of the army to intervene in the political process and take matters into its own hands. The Greek army has traditionally displayed a dual self-perception. On the one hand, the Army has identified itself with the homeland, owing to its role in securing the national sovereignty and independence of the polity. This syndrome, referred to by Kourvetaris as the *pallikari-leventis-philotimo* syndrome, was especially prominent during the early stages of the Greek state, when professionalism and western influences on the army’s operations were minimal (Kouvertaris 1971: 1046).

The *pallikari* syndrome is formed through the societal experiences of the armed forces and expresses a normative understanding of their role pertaining to public values. The *pallikari* is the man willing to sacrifice his life for the larger, national cause and to fight for the “sacred ideals” of the homeland, no matter how poorly defined the latter may be. His understanding of social life is based on a rough egalitarianism that views the social body as a homogenous entity, the type of *Gemeinschaft* articulated by Max Weber (Kourvetaris 1971: 1053). The *levent* is is the man primarily distinguished from his peers by his physical composure and statute, the type of army officer or simple soldier who, while sharing the normative underpinnings of the *pallikari*, builds on his tough training and military discipline to acquire a prominent role in the armed forces’ hierarchy. Similar to the *pallikari*, the *leventis* is distinguished by his self-reliance, his respect for authority, and his pride in himself and the country. Finally, the *philotimo*, whose literal translation is “love for honour”, shows in perhaps the clearest fashion how the army officer perceived himself in the Greek polity. All three types are synthesised in the Greek officer corps and interact with the socio-economic environment as well as the relationship between the armed forces and the political elites; as Kouvertaris (1971) has noted, “the officer’s self-image is a reflection of social and cultural processes as well” (Kouvertaris 1971: 1045).

On the other hand, after 1945, a second set of behavioural patterns was established, the “technical-specialist-managerial” syndrome. These were developed primarily due to exogenous influences on the Greek army after the end of the Second World War, particularly, membership in NATO. Under this pattern, the officer learns to value the more technocratic aspects of his profession, such as specialist knowledge on military affairs, the acquisition of vital organisational skills, and the application of rational criteria for professional promotion within the military hierarchy. Greece’s participation in the Western bloc during the Cold War meant that operational capabilities and specialist skills were deemed very important, because military officers had to compete with their colleagues from different countries for promotion and advancement within NATO. Nevertheless, the replacement of the more emotional *pallikari* syndrome with a more rationalist understanding of the role of the armed forces was not completed as long as the uncertain environment of the Cold war and political instability inside the country made the armed forces wary of relinquishing their influence and abandoning their function as guardians of the status quo.
Interestingly, the evolution of this second set of behavioural codes did not correlate significantly with the officers’ social background, their age or their place of birth. Officers of both urban and rural backgrounds tended to identify with a “synthetic professional type” that encompassed attributes of both syndromes. Moreover, while younger officers perceived themselves as more managerial than their older counterparts, the number who did so was not significant (Kouvertaris 1971: 1051).

The 1909-1949 Period

In 1899, ten years before the first coup of the twentieth century took place, a development that seemed quite innocuous at the time proved decisive for future developments, not only for civil-military relations, but also for political stability more generally. The Prime Minister, George Theotokis, brought to Parliament a bill that established a central command for the army. More importantly, upon the request of King George I, Theotokis also proposed that Crown Prince Constantine, characterized by Theotokis as “apolitical” and “neutral” in political confrontations, should head the new Central Command (Papacosma 1977: 21). The reaction from all political leaders was vociferous, some claiming that this action would divide Greeks along monarchical and republican lines.

From its establishment as an independent state in 1830, Greece had not managed to attain either economic growth or political stability; corruption, nepotism and clientelistic practices permeated the body politic as politicians aimed at securing their short-term interests. “Large landholders and regional magnates” dominated the political scene, while descendants of the participants in the 1821 War of Independence held key positions in the armed forces (Papacosma 1977: 37). The monarch was already a controversial figure, owing to the active engagement in political affairs and the authoritarian style of government that the young King Otto had introduced upon his arrival in Greece in 1834. Theotokis’s proposal promised further unrest, because the powers awarded to the crown prince went beyond his constitutional prerogatives.

The year 1909 was one of economic sluggishness and public disappointment. The government’s proposal for the army’s reorganisation according to the German Model of permanent non-commissioned officers was met with great hostility from the NCOs, who saw their chances of promotion beyond the rank of sergeant-general threatened. The forces within the army supportive of the King were also lessening in numbers, as the latter refused to back Crete’s call for union with Greece. Soon afterwards the Military League was created, comprised of representatives from both the army and the navy. Initial public support for a movement that called for the restoration of morality in public life was very high. Independent associations, trade guilds and craftsmen backed its imprecise agenda, which consisted of the call for a removal of the Prince from the armed forces, the reduction of tax rates, and reforms in the army’s operations -- the most important of which was the call for foreign officers to organise the army’s command functions (NRF). In August 1909 a large number of officers and soldiers gathered on the Goudhi hill outside Athens, having submitted their list of demands for
political, economic and military reforms to the Prime Minister. A large demonstration in Athens on September 27 confirmed the public’s backing of the Military League (Papacosma 1977: 89). The commanding officers of the movement then ordered the army officers to return to their barracks. Over the next few months, the League forced ambassadors and officials out of office, and, it compelled Parliament to legislate in its favour by reducing taxation (Sowards 1996). A year later, after the initial public support had diminished considerably, the League’s influence on the legislature was minimised. However, a dangerous precedent had been created: the civilian government was now effectively at the mercy of the army’s junior officers (Sowards 1996).

Beyond 1909

The split of both the civilian population and the armed forces along monarchical and republican lines largely characterized events during the next forty years. Both camps retained very different sets of priorities and political agendas. The strong influence of the pallikari idea in the armed forces further complicated matters and raised the stakes of the conflict. In 1917, the French and British forced the departure of King Constantine. The latter’s fierce opponent, Eleftherios Venizelos, became Prime Minister and ruled the country by martial law for three years, purging the armed forces of officers loyal to Constantine (Papacosma 1977: 189).

However, in 1920, the pattern was reversed when Venizelos was defeated at the polls, Constantine was enthroned again, and officers sympathetic to him were restored to their positions. Nevertheless, the defeat of the Greek Army in Asia Minor following years of combat, meant that the government faced a serious political crisis and in September 1922, Colonels Plastiras and Gonatas “proclaimed a ‘revolution’ aiming at saving the nation from further catastrophe” (Papacosma 1977: 179). Colonel Gonatas thus became the first army officer to lead the government (Papacosma 1977: 185). In the aftermath of the catastrophic war passions ran high, and Gonatas’ attempts to lead a moderate, conciliatory government stumbled, as its anti-Constantinist attitudes led it to coalesce with Republican forces (Papacosma 1977: 179).

One of the first acts of the new government was to exile King Constantine and the royal family. In November 1922, a military court decided to execute five prominent royalist politicians, all former ministers of state, for their role in the “Asia Minor disaster” (mikrasiatikh katastrofh). In terms of economic policy, Gonatas was reluctant to increase taxation at a sensitive political period, but his government increased the circulation of banknotes to cover additional expenditures resulting from the inflow of refugees from Asia Minor. The result, inevitably, was a rise in inflationary pressures (FWH).

In 1923, royalist and liberal elements in the armed forces attempted to overthrow the government, but the counter-plot “burnt itself out in less than a week” (Papacosma 1977: 180). In the aftermath of this failure, Republicans and anti-monarchists emerged triumphant from the December 1923 elections (which the royalists boycotted) and on March 25, 1924 the
Assembly proclaimed the first Hellenic Republic, confirmed after a plebiscite on April 13, 1924 (Papacosma, 1977:180).

Despite the proclamation of the Republic, successive governments were unable to deal effectively with widespread corruption and favouritism. Economic difficulties led to protests by labour organizations, while royalist forces attempted another unsuccessful coup in 1924 (FHW). When the Interior Minister Georgios Kondylis resigned from his post in 1925 amidst allegations by the Republicans that he had founded “fascist societies,” General Pangalos found a good pretext to successfully execute a *coup d’ état.* His political programme remained distinctly vague, promising to root out corruption and re-establish a better functioning of state institutions (FHW). Parliament’s initial tolerance of his administration soon gave way to disappointment and the withdrawal of support, as Pangalos reverted to authoritarianism by controlling the press, restricting civil liberties, and deporting political opponents (Papacosma 1977: 180). As a consequence, his government did not last long either, and a year later General Kondylis masterminded his downfall, hoping to reconcile the deeply split nation by forming a national coalition government.

As the 1920s drew to a close, the political and ideological divisions in both the armed forces and society at large became more pronounced, as the initial divisions between liberals and conservatives started extending to broader political categories. Liberals, communists, and socialists on the one hand, and conservatives, monarchists, and fascists on the other, constituted two highly polarised blocs. This schism played a major role in two further coups in 1933 and 1935, both unsuccessful. The latter was decisive in determining the fate of the flawed Republic. Venizelos had supported the 1935 plotters and the Conservative government acted quickly to restore the monarchy; King George returned to Greece in November 1935. When the elections of January 1936 failed to provide either of the two opposing camps, the Venizelists or the Royalists, with an absolute majority, political instability returned with the appointment by the King of Ioannis Metaxas, leader of the small “Freethinkers” Party, to the post of Army Minister (FHW). When the provisional Prime Minister Demertzis died, the King suspended certain articles of the Constitution and acted quickly to appoint Metaxas as the new Prime Minister. Metaxas received Parliament’s vote of confidence by a wide margin (Pelt 2001). However, in August 1936, using the pretext of an imminent communist insurrection, he proclaimed a dictatorship and annulled the Constitution.

1950-1975

Despite widespread resistance to the Nazi occupation during World War II, the country’s political divisions remained strong, and the end of the occupation in 1945 found Greeks as divided as ever in terms of their political loyalties. This had a huge impact on the army.

The military now became identified with the royal house and the American alliance. The officer corps was put on a new pedestal and was showered with official prestige and material
benefit. It was bitterly opposed to Papandreou and the liberals in the 1960s and many Greeks, as well as foreign observers, considered it only a matter of time before the army again interfered massively in the political process (Brown 1992:46).

Following the purge of Republican military personnel, aspiring officers had to undergo a “nationalism” test in which they had to prove reliable enough for the new, post-war, army. They had to demonstrate undeniable loyalty to the King and “steadfast opposition to communism and anyone having anything to do with it” (Zaharopoulos 1972: 21). The Civil War of 1946–49 thus confirmed the trend that had began under Metaxas (Makris 2000). Anti-Republican forces emerged triumphant, and in accordance with the pattern set because of the Cold War, they were allowed to prosecute, purge and send into exile thousands of communist sympathisers (Crampton 2002: 205).

Its defeat in the Civil War (1946–49) meant that the Left had no place in the context of an escalating Cold War. The Communist Party was banned in 1947 and leftists of all stripes were prosecuted. Law 509 of 1947 enabled the police to take action against anyone suspected of left-wing activities, while public sector employment presupposed the production of a “certificate of social beliefs” that denounced communism and left-wing ideological convictions. Such laws were gradually lifted after the fall of the Colonels’ junta in 1974 (Crampton 2002: 205).

After the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, Greece became an “integral part of the Cold War” and the country received $3.75 billion between 1947 and 1966, of which half were military supplies (Crampton 2002: 207). The US also played a decisive role in the admission of Greece to NATO in 1952 and the creation of a strictly conservative hierarchy in the country’s armed forces (Papacosma 1977: 185). During the Cold War, the “menace from the north” doctrine dominated Greek foreign and defence policy thinking until the 1970s (Hatzivassiliou 1995: 190). Ethnikophrosyne, or “national-mindedness”, was promoted in the cultural sphere by identifying the communists as an “internal enemy” that allegedly aspired to the destruction of the nation’s Christian Orthodox values (Stefanidis 2001).

Still, during the 1950s for the first time Greece achieved relative political stability and steady economic growth (Crampton 2002). At the same time, and as discussed earlier, the armed forces underwent a period of modernization and professionalization unprecedented in their history. According to Huntington’s thesis, this should have lessened their predisposition towards military intervention in political affairs. However, on April 21, 1967 a group of colonels and lieutenant colonels ordered the tanks out of their barracks, suspended political freedoms and imposed a military dictatorship. How is this to be explained?

It is important to stress that by the early 1960s the Right’s hold on power was threatened. Centrist and centre-left political forces were becoming increasingly powerful in electoral terms and the 1961 elections proved decisive in reinforcing their criticism of the established status quo (Crampton 2002: 211). They were adamant in their opposition to the existing “guided democracy” which was controlled by the King and placed considerable
restrictions on the ability to manoeuvre by parliamentary parties (Mouzelis, Pagoulatos 2002). Some even went as far as to question the desirability of Greece’s alliance with NATO and the western bloc in general. Huge protests by supporters of George Papandreou’s Centre Union party shook Athens and other cities, forcing new elections in 1963 from which the centre-left emerged triumphant. In April 1965, the new Prime Minister George Papandreou attempted to sack his Minister for Defence following a disagreement on the future direction of reforms in the armed forces and take over responsibility for the Ministry himself. However, the King rebuffed his request and refused to dismiss the recalcitrant Minister by arguing that it would be inappropriate for the Prime Minister to take over this role at a time when his son, Andreas Papandreou, was accused of connections with the left-leaning Aspida (Shield) organization. The King went on to engineer a split in the Centre Union Party, in effect carrying out a coup, and appointed five unstable coalition governments. Turmoil followed, despite the best efforts by the leadership of both the Centre Union and the right-wing National radical Union (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi, ERE) to restore political stability through a coalition. A military coup was successfully executed in April 1967 by a group of officers headed by George Papadopoulos (Sakkas 2004).

Papandreou’s aim in 1965 was to reorganize the armed forces along lines more sympathetic to his government and to encourage the promotion of low-rank officers that were disadvantaged by the political environment after 1949. He also wished to restructure the army’s intelligence services, which were operating in a more or less autonomous fashion, independent of the state. Many paramilitary groupings, such as the Battalions of National Security (ETA), maintained some degree of collaboration with the state, but their operation does not seem to have been approved by the government (Zaharoupoulos 1972: 24). However, his attempts were viewed suspiciously by the top echelons of the armed forces that saw in Papandreou’s attempts a threat both to Greece’s commitment to the anti-communist bloc and to their personal prerogatives within the army establishment. Both the army and the King remained wary of Papandreou and his reformist leadership, which called for the release of political prisoners in addition to the promotion of reformist officers to the army’s higher echelons (Crampton 2002: 213).

Undoubtedly, some of those officers must have genuinely believed that the political upheaval caused by this turmoil prepared the ground for a communist insurrection similar to the one of 1946, though there is little evidence to back up such a belief (Zaharopoulos 1972: 29). The still existent pallikari conception was by now interpreted along exclusively nationalist lines, and an increase in professionalization was dependent on the consolidation of the political and military status quo. Papandreou appeared to challenge this continuity, inviting a rethinking of the country’s post-war direction, and his actions were interpreted as a direct challenge to the prerogatives of the armed forces.

It is imperative to keep in mind that the 1967 coup was not the product of any one factor, but the result of multiple causes, including Greece’s post-war political development; the network of collaboration comprising extremist right-wing elements in the Palace, the army and paramilitary organisations established during the second World War; and
finally the political instability caused by the friction between Papandreou and the King (as well as between Karamanlis and the King) that appeared dangerous to some military officers. The rapid rise in the electoral fortunes of the centre and left after 1963 contributed to the decline of political stability by calling into question the unhindered control of the state apparatus by the Palace and its associates (Papacosma 1977: 185). Nonetheless, the root causes of instability leading to the coup have to be traced to the post-war political configuration. In the words of Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, “[c]ivil war and the anticommunist witch-hunting until 1974 legitimated semi-institutionalised mechanisms of repression [and] provided a pretext for the advent of the colonels in April 1967…” (Mouzelis, Pagoulatos 2002: 3).

Conclusion

This paper has explored the relationship between the army and politics in Greece from the beginning of the twentieth century to 1975. It has argued that, within the army, two antithetical tendencies and codes of behaviour have co-existed for more than fifty years. The pallikari and technocratic understandings have, at different points in time, tilted the balance in favour of the one (military intervention) or the other (non-intervention) outcome. Given the apparent repudiation of the "professionalization" theory by actual events in Greece, I have maintained that levels of professionalism per se cannot account for the army’s decision to intervene in 1967. What is therefore needed is an approach that will combine the long-term, structural effects of professionalization with the corresponding developments at the societal and economic level (pluralization leading to an eventual acquiescence with democratic values). Yet, despite the usefulness of such a structural approach, it remains true that the shifting attitudes of the armed forces regarding the question of intervention have also been influenced by contingent factors specific to Greek history. These have been the constellation of power in the political and party system, the political divisions prevalent since the early twentieth century that split the army along a republican-monarchical axis, and the explicit identification of the army with the monarchical forces after the end of the civil war and in the context of intense Cold War rivalry.

Endnotes

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Graduate Seminars Series at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey on April 30, 2003. I would like to thank an anonymous referee and the editor of Southeast European Politics for their comments and suggestions.
2 The Evelpidon Officers Candidate School dates back to the late 19th century, when it offered predominantly theoretical courses on mathematics and warfare. See Papacosma 1977:20
3 One of the justifications used by the Colonels for the execution of the coup d’état on April 21, 1967 was the alleged conspiracy organised by left-wing officers with the Centre Union Party MP Andreas Papandreou. The accuracy of this
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The accusation has never been proven, but the fact that there was an organisation in the army called ‘ASPIDA’ (‘Shield’) that was sympathetic to an anti-royalist course reveals that some degree of ideological/political diversity within the armed forces did exist. See Zaharopoulos 1972:25

4 The following section draws mainly from Kouvertaris, 1971.

5 The Young Turks movement that began a year earlier in Salonica and called for the restoration of the 1878 Ottoman Constitution was a primary source of inspiration for the Military League and its founders. Popular support for the Young Turks was widespread and the Greek press was for a time filled with Turkophile pieces. See Papacosma (1977:39).

6 The Greek army’s defeat in Turkey in 1922 constitutes a defining moment in the evolution of the Greek state. The population exchange following the war put immense pressure on the government to provide housing and employment for the newly arrived refugees, while the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 led to a boundary settlement between Greece and the young Turkish Republic.

7 Although the Civil War did not start until 1946, divisions between anti-communist and royalist supporters on the one hand and communists and their sympathizers on the other had already emerged during the country’s occupation by the Axis powers. See Stefanidis 2001.

8 Although the Greek Communist Party never became a formidable electoral force in the years prior to the Second World War, it nevertheless comprised the core of EAM (National Liberation Movement), the biggest anti-Nazi movement during the occupation years (1941 -- 44). After the country’s liberation, the popularity of EAM reached very high levels.

9 Aspida was a group composed of reformist officers who felt their prospects for promotion and conditions of service had worsened due to their refusal to espouse the right-wing politics of their seniors.

10 For instance, the assassination of Grigoris Lambrakis, MP for the United Democratic Left Party (Enomeni Dimokratiki Aristera, EDA) in Salonica in the summer of 1963, has been seen as the act of the military police in collaboration with paramilitary group. The government of the time was headed by Constantine Karamanlis, the country’s first democratically elected Prime Minister following the junta’s overthrow in 1974, and does not appear to have been involved in the operation.

11 See Zaharopoulos pp.18-19 for a theoretical discussion of the army’s ‘interest group’ status.

References


