The Road to Europe II: 
When Will the Next Enlargement Occur?

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ABSTRACT

Structured in three parts, this paper attempts to provide a broader perspective on the systemic change which occurred in Romania after the fall of communism and in conjunction with the ongoing European Accession process. The political developments before 1989 are discussed in the first part of the paper in order to provide a better understanding of the existing political climate. The second part of the paper is focused on the exit mode from totalitarianism and its consequences. The last part explains the possible future directions of development.

Romania before 1989

As a geographical representation on the European map, Romania today is a creation of the Second World War, its borders redrawn both during and after the war. As a political space, it is a new creation emerging from the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe.

The generally negative perception of imitation, lack of innovation, and pre communist reactivation of traditions in the introduction of democratic practices in Central and Eastern Europe (Arato 2000; Church and Hendriks 1995), as well as the export of western norms to the East (Rupnik 2004), proved to be a much better choice than the creation of an indigenous variant of democracy. In the post communist space, the main options for successful democratization are reconnection with the past, including the revitalization of the historical parties; continuation by the communist elites; and, finally, political novelty–new parties and new constitutions.

Pre communist inheritances

In the context of the reactivation of pre communist traditions, it is necessary to ask what was available to Romania. Dellenbrant observes that Romania had almost no tradition regarding democracy, as opposed to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (Dellenbrant 1993; Weiner, 1994). So any attempt to investigate how democracy worked during the inter war period in
Romania should be based on the evolution of the party system, as well as on the 1923 and 1938 constitutions.

Before the Great War, Romania was a constitutional monarchy based on a two-party system, the alternation of power shared between the Conservative Party, representing the land-owning elite, and the Liberal Party, representing the bourgeoisie. The territorial unification of Romania, in 1918 led to the creation of an unstructured multi-party system, because the increase in the number of parties was not a true ideological one, but had developed around the unification project. Therefore, in spite of their importance, the unionist parties lost their raison d’être after the union. However, from the mid 1920s until the imposition of a royal dictatorship in 1938, the political life in Romania returned to a two-party system, with parliamentary supremacy alternating between the Liberal Party and the National Peasants Party.

The 1923 constitution established Romania as a democracy, even if its functionality was limited (Dellenbrant 1993). During the dynastic crisis that followed the death of King Ferdinand, the Romanian political elite proved unable to maintain its cohesion and coherence. Although he had abdicated, Carol II returned as king in 1930, and eight years later he imposed a non-democratic constitution on the country, and he formally dissolved the existing political parties, which he replaced with a single party which he led. In 1940, following severe territorial losses, Carol II appointed General Antonescu head of state, replacing a personal dictatorship with a military dictatorship.

Romania therefore became a communist country after seven years of royal and military dictatorship and with confused political elites. Dismantled by the authoritarian regime, without enough time to crystallize any underground survival strategies, but informally consulted during the Antonescu regime, Romania’s political elites were paralyzed. The Stalinist trials, directed against party leaders during the early 50s contributed even more to their loss of identity.

Romanian Stalinism

I have presented the devolution of the Romanian political elites before the Second World War. As the intention of this study is the attempt to define the main characteristics of political elites in Romania after the fall of the Ceauşescu regime, a brief presentation of the Romanian Stalinism is also required.

Arriving in power in 1965, Ceauşescu gained international fame in 1968 due to his refusal to invade Czechoslovakia and his criticism of the USSR, which he referred to it as a “shameful event in the history of the revolutionary movements” (Ulam 1974). This is why many believed that he sought to bring Romanian communism closer to the national communist line as formulated by Tito (Tismăneanu, 1992).

As a result, Romania not only gained western support, but also secured a degree of independence from Moscow (Ulam, 1974). But despite Ceauşescu’s promises of liberalization and his image as an early promoter of glasnost (Cipowski 1991; Tismăneanu 1992), the restoration of the Secret Police (Securitate) in the 1970s signaled his shift from a liberal leader to a
more autocratic one. The most important aspect was the shift of power from an absolutist politburo to the absolute power of one man (Cipkowski 1991; Tismaneanu 1992). Using the Secret Police, the dictatorship of the proletariat became the dictatorship of one leader who stayed in power by manipulating ideological mythology, nationalism, ideological faith (Volkogonov 1998), and the cult of personality (Michta 1994). By the end of Ceaușescu’s regime, the party was merely a large forum where his ideas were received as the only valid ones. During Ceaușescu’s “Stalinist” rule, the only criterion for political success was the loyalty shown to the leader (Cipkowski 1991), while personal power was consolidated within his family (Linz and Stepan 1996).

His “independence” from the Kremlin allowed Ceaușescu to dismiss any developments within the USSR, such as glasnost and perestroika, as irrelevant (Rose 1998). The only indigenous attempt to build a “constructive dialogue that may save the system,” contained in an open letter addressed by six communists to Ceaușescu a few months before the uprising, failed. For Romania’s xenophobic communists, any call for reform was perceived as a betrayal of the national interest (Tismaneanu, 1991). So the proposal was rejected and its authors confined to house arrest. The question therefore became whether there was a communist elite capable of promoting reform from within the party.

The Long Journey

A Different Exit 22nd of December 1989-May 1990

Considering the nature of the totalitarianism imposed by Ceaușescu, the first aspect of the change that should be addressed is the nature of the events of December 1989. The main debate lay in the uncertainty of who acted as the catalyst for change. Jackson argues that the revolution against the dictatorial regime of Ceaușescu was closely connected with the idea of a coup of high-level communists (Jackson 1995), while Dellenbrant considers the revolution a product of a carefully planned coup, regardless of its origins (Dellenbrant 1993). Support for their thesis can be found in the affirmations of General Nicolae Militaru, that the Front was created six months before the uprising (Reuters 1990). Considering the evolution of Romanian politics, I share the opinion that the revolution was improperly named, because there was an involvement by the second-hand communist elite in these events. The actions of the new leaders provide the best evidence for the conclusion that this was not a revolution in the traditional sense of the word.

The status of the National Salvation Front (NSF) was defined on December 22, 1989. According to the published text in the Official Gazette of Romania, the NSF was ‘an interim structure established in action and in [an] ad hoc manner and open to proposals from all the political groups...who fought and won’. Therefore, the NSF was an institutional structure with the clear purpose of including all the participants in the fight against communism, its main mission to fill the power vacuum created by the sudden change of regime.

The separation of powers was far from being realized in practice, although the NSF expressed a commitment to it. The interim president, Iliescu, was the Head of the Council of the NSF (executive organ) and the
Chairman of the Provisional Council of National Unity (interim legislature) (Socor 1990). Iliescu’s model of reform was based on the approach taken by Gorbachev; it perpetrated a political order built on the idea of one party system. His declarations refer to political pluralism as nothing more than an “obsolete ideology of the XIXth century” (Tismăneanu 1992). As opposed to the developments in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, Romania was not yet on the way to democracy but rather experimenting with a milder form of authoritarian regime, which was later to evolve into democracy (Dellenbrant 1993).

The theory that Romania had undergone first a transition from dictatorship to authoritarianism is supported by examining the behavior of the NSF through the first electoral campaign. The mechanisms used by the new government not only reinforced the continuation of communist methods; they were far from being democratic. Elections were initially scheduled for April, but pressure from the opposition forced their postponement until May. The NSF also registered as a political party, thus contradicting its interim purpose. As a result of this decision the opposition organized a rally against the NSF, which resulted in the first arrival of the miners from the Jiu Valley to Bucharest (Ionescu, 1990). The headquarters of the main opposition parties were destroyed by these defenders of the “original democracy” proposed by Iliescu’s partisans. In spite of provisions in the electoral law that all political formations have the same rights in presenting their programs on national television, the NSF received more time to campaign (Ştefănescu 1990). Finally, apart from physical violence, the new regime used calumny on a large scale in its attempt to discredit its opponents and spread rumors during this first electoral race.

The quality of the electorate present in Romania after the fall of communism is another question which needs to be addressed in order to understand how and why the communists succeeded in governing post communist Romania. Civil society was weak because all attempts to crystallize this type of social construction were repressed under the communist regime. Consequently, any revolts against the regime did not contribute to a change in this respect. Instead, the use of force enhanced the division of Romanian society as a whole. In the first five months of the Iliescu regime, Romanians based their political options on the supernatural help provided by the “Divinity.” Invoking the divinity in political action proved that some members of Romanian society were simply unsuited to cast their vote in a competent rational method.

To sum up, the dictatorship in Romania, evolved into an authoritarian regime based on Gorbachev’s reformist ideas, which allowed room for pluralism but used communist methods, to obtain a majority. Romania’s originality can be seen in the transformation of a state institution, declared anti-communist in essence, into a political party composed mainly of the second-hand communist elite, which ruled using communist means.

The Sandpaper Revolution

Any attempt to equate the events of the December 1989 with the velvet revolutions in the rest of CEE is misleading, because the process of
democratization and economic reform only can be discussed in Romania after May 1990. Because of the sudden change induced by a violent revolution, neither political forces nor the civil society were prepared for conscious action to influence the nature of future developments. Five months after the change, there was political pluralism, but the regime following the dictatorship had strayed far from the path to liberal democracy and had acquired authoritarian attributes. It was only in 1990 that Romania assumed the position that neighboring countries such as Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia had achieved during the late 1980s. After the first free, but controlled, elections, it can be argued that the Romanian case was somewhat similar to the velvet revolutions. The desire of the Front to create an “original democracy” was not caused by local political conditions, but by the desire of the communist elite to remain in power for as long as possible, and to do so in a legitimate manner.

Any attempt to adopt an already tested model failed, since none of the existing models, whether Swedish, Austrian, South Korean or Japanese, were considered suitable to fulfill the requirements of the transformed communist ideology (Ionescu 1990). Something new had to be created in order to maintain the status quo of the communists and yet be perceived as having democratic potential. The need for justification was caused by the attempt to define Romania in relation with both West and East. With a still existent USSR in the East, emerging democracies in the near West, and a supranational economic entity with a political vocation in the far West, Romania had to reconstruct itself without the risk of being politically isolated.

The Romanian “sandpaper revolution” might be best characterized by the extensive use of popular benevolent violence in restricting the democratic actions proposed by the opposition parties and internal purges of the governing party. During this period, the main instruments for action in the continuing attempt to legitimate the violence were the miners from the Jiu Valley. Started as an anti-communist rally in late April 1990, the phenomena of University Square continued after the elections, until mid June. Although the police and the military re-established order, President Iliescu appealed again to his main populist instrument of repression, the miners. The main reason he did so was his willingness to intimidate the opposition by violence and his desire to denigrate it in the eyes of the electorate. Such action would contribute to the consolidation of power obtained in the May elections. Furthermore, to “keep the spirit of the revolution alive” the internal leadership had to be purged of all “unsuited” elements which had drifted away from the official party line. Advocating shock therapy in the field of economic reforms, the Roman government placed itself in contradiction to the NSF vision, which favored slow reforms and hostility towards economic privatization (East and Pontin 1997). Although the facts point to the non-involvement of Iliescu during the fourth arrival of the miners in Bucharest on September 24-28, 1991, the outcome suggests the contrary because originally the demands of the miners included the resignation of the president. Following talks between the leader of the miners, Miron Cozma, and President Iliescu, both sides settled for a compromise outcome, the resignation of the Roman government (Gheorghe
This negotiation is the only one resembling the round table talks which characterized the velvet revolutions, but its democratic character is questionable because the only political outcome desired was the purge of the leadership.

Another particularity of the Romanian situation was the promulgation of the first Romanian Constitution after the fall of the dictatorial regime. What is unique about this constitution is the establishment of the semi-presidential regime. Other post-communist constitutions created parliamentary democracies, even if only formally, as in the case of Yugoslavia. Originally perceived as an anti-communist movement, the NSF not only evolved into a state institution and transformed itself into a political party, but by opting for the legislative-constituent method of adoption for a new constitution, it was able to legitimate its power, and to influence developments.

Even if no political negotiations were involved in the reshaping of the political spectrum of post-December Romania, the sandpaper revolution was carried out and completed in an unconscious manner by an embryonic civil society. Deteriorating living conditions, inflation, and general apathy influenced the electorate to be less supportive towards the NDSF. As the results of the 1992 elections showed, there was no longer a plebiscitary support for Iliescu or for his political formation.

**The Return to Europe**

In order to illustrate better the relationship between systemic change and EU accession, and the differences between the velvet and sandpaper revolutions, a comparison between Romania and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland is useful. Although these countries applied for EU membership at different times, the common aspect is that the EU was identified as the final goal of their transitions during the early stages of systemic change. Poland and Hungary were the first of the CEECs to sign the Europe Agreements in 1991; the Czech Republic signed it in 1993. This delay on the part of the Czech Republic was caused by the separation process of the Czech and Slovak Republics.

Romania was the only post-communist country to sign a Treaty with the USSR (Cioroianu 2000), which indicates clearly the foreign policy priorities of its new “democratic” government. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Romania was in the position to reassess its foreign policies priorities, and its orientation towards the EU was primarily the result of the disappearance of alternatives.

The establishment of diplomatic relations with the EC in 1990 was necessary in order to disrupt the international political isolation of Romania, but the Trade and Cooperation Agreement was signed only in 1991. Considering that the EC signed Trade and Cooperation Agreements with Poland in 1988 and Hungary 1989, the time delay is easily observable. The US refusal to renew Most Favored Nation status for Romania contributed to Iliescu’s decision to form a coalition with nationalist parties during his second term as president (1992-1996) (Weiner 1994). The nationalists included the Văcăroiu government and favored protectionism from foreign
investment. But the main reasons that made the CEECs willing to join the EU were primarily economic, and one of them was that foreign investment was more likely to be boosted by the prospects of EU membership (Jones 2001). Considering the orientation against these foreign investments in Romania’s politics, one should question the real willingness of the governing political elite to join the EU, especially given that the EA was signed in 1993.

Even after the European Agreement was signed, it took two years until some sort of political consensus was reached. The Snagov Declaration of 1995 came as a reaction to the EA coming into force, and so it seems that with regard to EU accession, the Romanian political elite was reactive rather than pro-active, as were its neighbors. However, the Snagov Declaration has not led to a political project because the only outcome has been the formal recognition of the importance of Romania’s accession to the EU. To underline the reactionary character of Romanian political elites, Moisă argues that the catalyst for the Romanian political project was the beginning of the accession negotiations in 2000, and not the coming into force of the EA, as was the case for neighboring countries (Moisă 2001).

This reactionary character was, in my opinion, caused by the effects of the sandpaper revolution, which did not allow room for a political class to be constructed as a result of a negotiation, but as a result of the imposition and continuation of communist methods. The delay between Romania and the other candidates that had more or less the same communist legacies is even more acute in the context of what I call the Romanian Crisis.

**The Romanian Crisis**

Reading the first phrase of the third chapter of the actual Program of Governance proposed by the newly appointed government in 2004, the use of political distortion still exists in the Romanian politics. According to this formulation, “The European Integration is, for nearly fifteen years, the main political objective of all the political parties that have governed Romania” (Third Chapter of the Governance Programme, European Integration 2004). According to this formulation the resulting conclusion would be that all the political parties which governed Romania since 1990 favored EU accession. In reality, it is hard to identify precisely when EU accession became a well-defined political objective. In this regard, one could question the means used by the Tăriceanu government in marketing European integration and thus continuing the Romanian original democracy.

Romania’s current situation was generated by the first years of confused transition as well as by more recent developments in the accession process. The major aspects of the Romanian case which I will discuss are the desire for early elections expressed by President Băsescu and the safeguard clauses included in the Accession Treaty.

Regarding the first aspect, President Băsescu declared his support for early elections, arguing that the Alliance should have all the political power in order to be held politically responsible. The signal sent by the President is that the coalition is not functioning well, which means that the actual coalition may be in a similar situation as the previous one (1996-2000).
Liberal Party, the other member of the Democratic Alliance, agrees on the importance of such elections but extends the blame to the opposition as well. The main question raised by this initiative is how these elections will be reflected in the Commission’s Comprehensive Monitoring Reports. According to the Romanian President, there will be no negative reflection in the Commission’s evaluation. However, the only constitutional provision that allows the President to dissolve the parliament is conditional upon the refusal of the Parliament to agree to the Prime Minister (Article 89 of the 2003 Romanian Constitution). Any such measure should not leave room for interpretation regarding its constitutionality. For Romania, the major risk would be a Commission decision stating that it no longer fulfils the political criteria for entry into the EU.

The safeguard clauses constitute the last aspects of the present Romanian crisis. As affirmed at the European Council in December 2004, “EU membership is now an imminent certainty” (Conclusions of the European Council Summit, December 16-17, 2004) for Romania and Bulgaria, but it is not a guarantee of membership, because safeguard clauses were included in the Accession Treaties. These mechanisms were defined by Mr. Rehn, Commissar for Enlargement, in its speech in Bucharest on 28th of February, 2005. There are two such mechanisms, one regarding both applicant countries, and the second one referring only to Romania. The common one could be triggered only in the case of serious risk would require a recommendation of the Commission and unanimity in the Council. The one regarding Romania requires only a qualified majority and refers to the specific conditions in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs and Competition. Both these safeguard clauses are applicable at any time, and may result in a postponement of enlargement for one year. Unfortunately, there are no specific provisions as to what the course of action will be, if after one year these countries still fall short. The safeguard clauses should be taken seriously by the Romanian government, given the position adopted by the British House of Commons, which questioned the European Minister, Mr Denis McShane, about his support of the accession timetable “which we felt called into question the extent to which the safeguard clauses he mentioned were to be taken altogether seriously” (British House of Commons, European Scrutiny, Third Report, 2004). I have chosen this specific British interpellation, owing to the general “Euroscepticism” expressed by this country and because Britain in general is more in favor of widening rather than deepening the Union. Combined with the Brussels declarations, the safeguard clauses should be taken more seriously.

Another interesting aspect of the crisis is the pampering of Bucharest by Brussels. Political correctness is not taken to the extremes, but it may be misunderstood by the Romanian politicians. All the messages sent are in favor of the generally accepted accession timetable, but there is a real demand for effective reforms, given the declarations of Mr. Rehn, Borelli, and Moscovici. The Romanian political class is usually perceived as having confused goals and interests, and its reactions to the pressure applied by the EU, in an attempt to obtain the indispensable results, may seem inappropriate. On January 25, 2005, the Romanian PM warned the EU that any delay will disappoint the Romanian electorate.
Three Scenarios for the future

There are three possible scenarios regarding Romania's European accession:

First, Romania can join in 2007 if the “anticipation” of the Council is correct, and if the Romanian government manages to implement all the *acquis* (Conclusions of the European Council Summit, December 16-17, 2004). As specified in the roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania, there will be a considerable increase in the financial assistance offered by the EU. The financial implications were set up in the Annex of the Roadmaps; they are as follows: €860 million in 2004, increased in 2005 to €931 and finally in 2006, the year before accession to €1 billion (Roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania, 2002). Moreover, Romania will be the beneficiary of €10 billion per year after the accession, from 2007 to 2009. But there are strings attached; the Commission’s recommendation is for Romania to improve its absorption capacity.

The Romanian PM is right in mentioning the public support that the EU has in Romania, especially in the context of the rather disastrous results of the last elections for the European Parliament in the new member states (Chan 2004). Romania is the largest and most populous country among the negotiating candidates; therefore, maintaining its positive attitude is seen as enhancing positive results. One of the main reasons for the EU enlargements was the need for security in Eastern Europe (Jones 2001, and Barnes 1995). Postponing Romania’s accession could cause some turbulence in the country by providing the nationalist parties with the means for transforming their ideologies into Euroscepticism. The last important reason is a moral one, because the EU is not willing to accept failure in the context of increased financial assistance and constant monitoring.

For Romania the only objective is to join in 2007. In the context of a successful integration, the main beneficiary would be the Democratic Alliance. If successful, the Liberal Party and the Democrats will be the main political parties to alternate in power in “European” Romania. The role of the Social Democrats will be diminished, particularly in the case of a possible witch hunt against corruption.

Second, Romania can join by 2008 if any of the safeguards clauses are invoked. If Romania does not produce the much needed results by the autumn of 2006, the safeguards may come in effect.

Why would the EU use the safeguards? First, it would do so to protect its image in the world. It is not the aim of EU to show weakness, and the risks of having an improperly prepared member are too high for the Union.

However, Romania does not need to fear the safeguard clauses. If they are invoked, there will be a real possibility for the country to be adequately prepared for accession, and it is likely that Romania will benefit from extra financial assistance. Internally, however, it may produce undesired results, in the terms defined above, such as the possible rise of Euroscepticism. In this case, early elections will be called by the Social
Democrats, the successor of NDSF, and it is likely that the Democrats will be removed from power which might be the exclusion of the Democrats from political life. A parallel can be drawn with the exclusion of the National Peasants Christian Party after the unsuccessful 1996-2000 government. If this happens it is more likely that Romania will have a two party system or that it may transform itself into a democracy based on a one and a half party system.

Third, Romania’s accession can be postponed until further notice under two circumstances: if the Commission concludes that Romania does not fulfill the political criteria, as in the case of early elections; and, if the safeguard clauses are used, and Romania fails to further integrate the acquis into the national law after 2008.

This is the worst scenario for Romania, because it will delay the accession by more than a few years. If elections are not held before 2008, that should be the year for Parliamentary elections. The electorate is most likely to cast its votes for the Social Democrats, blaming the failure of accession on the current coalition. At a general level, the delay may trigger not only a decrease in the support of the Romanians for the Union, but also generate political apathy, which will cause a lack of political involvement.

For the EU, the postponement of Romania’s accession is not the best option either. It will be a three level failure with political, economic, and social aspects. On the political level, the Union will fail to negotiate effectively, while the use of more extra budgetary resources is likely to raise questions, especially from the ten new members. Addressing the social level, the EU will lose its public support, and this would be an unfortunate outcome.

Conclusions

The uniqueness of Romanian politics does not lie in the desires of the second-hand communist elites, or in its violent approach towards the change of regime. I believe that this originality can be explained only by the atrophy of the political elites. First, the inclusion of Transylvania in Romania caused a change in the party system. The new political force was not properly equipped to understand the implications of democratic political participation, while the existing one, the Liberal Party, did not have enough time to adapt to the emerging competition. Second, more confusion within the political elites was generated by the introduction of the one-party system in 1938. Third, during communism, not only were the interwar elites destroyed, but during the Ceaușescu dictatorship there was no room to develop alternate communist elites.

The sandpaper revolution meant not only the denial of all forms of negotiations, but delayed the creation of political elites able to identify viable solutions for the existing transitional situation. The desired result of the sandpaper revolution was the grinding down of society and the maintenance of the existing communist status quo, not the refurbishing of this society, because refurbishment implies the prior existence of something. In the case of Romania, prior to 1989, civil society, as understood in the West, simply did not exist.
Romania’s current situation, generated by the sandpaper effect, is characterized once more by a divided political elite and a lack of political coherence. Considering the reactive character of Romanian political elites, positive outcomes will occur only if there is adequate input from Brussels.

The European Union has already expressed its reluctance in offering its “membership card” to Romania by the inclusion of the safeguard clauses in the Accession Treaty. How safe these safeguard clauses are remains to be seen. If applied, they may constitute a catalyst for reform, or they may be interpreted as a punitive measure. If no explicit provisions are made concerning what will happen if Romania does not fulfill the entry requirements after the extra year (2008), then, the safeguard are not only useless but also dangerous for Brussels. Lack of reform, involuntary or not, may open the emergency entry door for Romania. The EU may be in the unique position of being sued by Romania for not complying with the provisions of the Accession Treaty. Of course, the prospects for such a judiciary membership are far from being realized in reality, but the danger exists and proves once more that the decision of the EU to enlarge was not carefully thought out.

Endnotes

1 Offering the position of Chair of the Council of Ministers to Tătărascu 1934-1937, member of the Liberal Party, he succeeded to split the Liberal Party
2 Romanian Defense Minister.
3 Second-hand communist elite refers to the non Ceaușescu family members of the elite that were purged by the dictator, in his attempts to consolidate the power.
5 Among the Iliescu’s supporters slogans: “Oh Lord, if You love us, than protect Iliescu”, while the opposition supporters, believed that an earthquake on the 30th of May, was a divine sign.
6 As usually referred by the President Iliescu during the first two years.
7 After the demise of the Roman Government, the NSF split, and two new political formations emerged: NDSF (National Democratic Salvation Front), the successor of the NSF, led by Iliescu, and the NSF led by Roman, pleading for more economic reforms.
8 Czech Republic, applied for membership in 1996, while Poland and Hungary applied in 1994.
9 Romania was the first of the CEECs to establish official relations with the EC back in 1974 (www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/romania/index.htm).
10 One of the main used slogans was: “We won’t sell our country”.
11 I am considering the declarations of President Băsescu regarding the "corrupt country" labeling of Romania.
12 Prime Minister Mr. Tăriceanu 2005, interviewed by the Chief Editor of Europolitix.
References


