The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community-Building Institution

SRDJAN VUCETIC
York University, Toronto

ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the ways in which the Stability Pact emulates the OSCE and EU security community-building model and argues that the Pact has constructed a nascent security community in the Balkans. Furthermore, the region represents a unique instance of a security community contractually built by an outside party, which means that regional security will continue to depend on both regional and extra-regional actors.

Introduction
The launch of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP) at the Sarajevo Summit in July 1999 was surrounded with a great deal of fanfare. The event was sold as ‘historic’ on two grounds: first, the SP established the premier regional forum for political, economic and social dialogue. In no small part, the SP came as a result of a realization that the problems in the Balkans are transborder and closely intertwined and cannot be solved, in the words of U.S. President Clinton, “piecemeal, one country, one province, one crisis at a time” (Clinton, 1999: 1520). Second, SP was constructed as a contractual link that guides all Balkan states into the European mainstream, particularly the EU. As such, the SP was welcomed as a historical turning point and an important step towards a fully democratic and united Europe. In the words of analysts and practitioners, the SP came as a much-awaited ‘entry strategy’; an attempt to ‘Europeanize’ and ‘de-Balkanize’ the Balkans (Bildt 2001: 158; Pierre 1999: 2), to the point where, according the inaugurating speech by Finnish President Ahtisaari, “war becomes unthinkable.” A May 2001 Office of the Special Coordinator of the SP statement claims that Ahtisaari’s wish has been fulfilled and that “war is no longer an option” in the region. Expressed in the face of the raging crisis in Macedonia, this proclamation, lest one impute a high dosage of
naïve optimism to the officials, must be read as a programmatic statement about the political future of the peninsula rather than an already established practice. Nevertheless, the notion of the Balkans as a no-war community is not entirely out of place.

What Ahtisaari and the Special Co-ordinator invoke in their statements is the idea of the Balkans as a security community defined in the original – so-called Deutschian – model: a group of states in which “there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way” (Deutsch 1957:5). Last time someone checked, the region decidedly did not fit the description. In 1983, Aurel Braun compared the region to the community made up of the group of states comprising the Nordic Council and concluded that: “Drawing any meaningful analogies between two regions […] would involve more than stretching the imagination but would instead border on stretching credulity” (1983:22). Since Braun wrote dramatic changes took place on the ground as well as in theory. A fresh assessment is in order.

Because security communities are ‘relatively rare developments’ and because the focus of theorization lay elsewhere, the concept of security community has existed largely on the fringes of IR theory until recently (Adler and Barnett 1998:3). Immanuel Adler has developed the model of a ‘security community-building institution’ as a new constructivist model in international security studies. According to Adler, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is an example of an institution which socially constructs community. In its mature, post-1992 form, the OSCE security model, he argues, has been diffused to and adopted by other institutions, including NATO and the EU (Adler 1998:120). Herein lies the main question explored in this paper: can the SP be regarded as a security community-building institution? In consideration of this question, my intent is to present new interpretations rather than to advance hitherto known descriptive and analytical material.

Security communities are commonly, although not exclusively, seen as regional. Because the Balkan states are small and have had a limited experience of independence since the Middle Ages, regional security has traditionally been determined by extra-regional actors. History shows a number of extra-regional bids for hegemony over the region, all of which had the calamitous knock-off effect in unresolved minority and border issues. Today, the number of extra-regional actors involved in the region perhaps matches the number of regional political units. And while differences among the states no doubt exists, the Balkan is considered as a region onto itself, distinct from that of Europe for factors other than geography.

Since the nineteenth century, the peninsula has been commonly seen as, to use a hackneyed cliché, a ‘powder keg’ – a source of volatility and violence in Europe. A new generation of literature, emanating in the mid-1990s, finds that the terms ‘Balkanize’ and ‘Balkanization’ are representations of Balkanism - an elaborate discourse against which Western Europe defines itself. Maria Todorova posits:
Geographically inextricable form Europe, yet culturally constructed as ‘the other,’ the Balkans became, in time, the object of a number of externalized political, ideological and cultural frustrations and have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the ‘European’ and ‘the West’ has been constructed (Todorova 1995: 445).

Balkanism emanates from the outsiders’ inability to comprehend the extreme ethnic and cultural heterogeneity of the peninsula. The English language, for instance, has adopted the term ‘Balkanization’ to denote petty-minded political fragmentation. While some of this ethno-cultural wealth has shrunk as a result of the numerous attempts at nation-state homogenization (some of the most violent of which took place over the last decade) the region remains the one of baffling diversity; boundaries of ethno-national communities in the region are still at great variance with borders of the political units. Yet Balkanism plays a pivotal role in all popular prejudices about the region and, more important, it is the cause for the major difficulties in self-understanding, self-representation, and national and regional identities of the Balkan peoples. Subject to such discursive rendering, local self-perceptions are often confusing: a common identity is at once distinctive, unevenly distributed, and disputed.

A developmental paradigm logically stemmed from Balkanism: modernization of the Balkans was to mean ‘Europeanization’ – transformation of the heterogeneous region into a set of homogenous nation-states on the European model (Mazower 2000: 104). Of course, Balkan states have never completely ‘Europeanized’. Today, the polities in the region are generally equipped with a combination of parliamentary democracy; ethno-nationalist, largely monolithic political parties; weak state institutions; and more or less free, but certainly clientelist market economy. On the other hand, institutional and territorial legitimacy of many regional states is not accepted by the absolute majority of ethno-national groups. Furthermore, most of the region is in the process of transition from communist autocracies to pluralist democracies, whereby only Slovenia has managed to turn into a ‘consolidated democracy’. The thorny process of state- and nation-building is far from over in most parts of the region.

Another feature is common to the Balkans: both the governments and citizens have expressed their desire for involvement in the European integration project and they regard full membership as a realistic object. A precedent has been set, so to speak, with the accession of Greece to the European Community in 1981. By the end of 2000, all states in the region have come to redirect their international relations to actively pursue and maintain a strong openness towards Europe and the West. Not only is this obvious from a look at the source of their imports and the destination of their exports, but from their changing political and diplomatic loyalties. The fact that no state in the region remains outside the SP, which is correctly viewed as a path towards the EU, reflects those priorities. This ‘collective membership’, in more ways than one, affirms the region’s European
identity. By the same token, national identities of the states in question are being transformed into a blend of traditional ethno-nationalist identities and ‘European’ values such as liberal democracy, the rule of law, political tolerance, and human rights.

A change of attitude is apparent on the part of the outsiders as well. While the remarks made by practitioners and analysts about ‘Europeanization’ and ‘de-Balkanization’ reveal the perseverance of Balkanism, the recent developments show that we are moving towards a broader and better understanding of the region. For one, the SP’s full name – Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe – was adopted with the conviction that the region belongs to Europe. Perhaps following the Latin adage nomen est omen, the drafters decided to shun the term ‘the Balkans’ in favour of ‘South Eastern Europe’. The change of the name is symbolic: the ideas and practices in the SP thus represent not only the latest and most systematic attempt on the part of extra-regional players to establish a regional framework for security, but also a desired commitment to the idea(l) of one Europe. Therefore, the Balkans are slowly being transformed from ‘backyard’, ‘periphery’, ‘border’ or ‘transition zone’ into ‘Europe.’

The Adler-Barnett model of security communities is markedly state-centric: “[groups] of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change” (1998:30). The clause ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’ refers to a situation in which states do not consider policies that can be seen by others as militarily threatening (e.g. arms race, contingency-planning against each other, etc.) To be sure, the situation where ‘war is no longer an option’ can be explained by other models. In particular, the security community approach can be easily confused with a similar analytical concept for understanding regional security. Security regimes, like security communities, refer to something more than simply short-term confluence of interest. As I understand them, security communities can be defined by three-buzzwords, which can be seen in a causal continuum: socialization (high quantity and quality of exchange), reciprocity (trust and social learning), and intersubjectivity (shared identity, “we-feeling”, mutual sympathy). According to the Adler-Barnett model, security communities develop in three phases: nascent, ascending, and mature (1998:48). The indicators of the mature security community include unfortified intramural borders (i.e. free movement of goods, capital, and people), dense transnational interactions, pooling of military and other resources, internationalization of authority in some issue-areas, and a regional collective identity. The USA-Canada region and the EU fit the description of a mature security community. The ascendant stage is characterized by close political relationships, widening social, and economic networks, and a great deal of interdependence in terms of military procurement and intelligence sharing. But unlike in the mature stage, cognitive structures are modest. Here, Southeast Asia stands as an approximate example. In the Adler-Barnett model, important common features of the latter two stages are functional organizational and institutional networks.
The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

The nascent phase, which concerns this paper the most, is characterized by organizational emulation and a regular unawareness to the existence of security community. At this stage, the regional actors do not have or follow a plan; instead they test the nature of the ongoing exchanges. Presumably, features such as trust, ‘we-feeling’, shared identities and meanings are in short supply in the nascent stage. Not surprisingly for this stage, institutions play a crucial role in interpreting, deepening and extending the ongoing exchange. Security community-building institutions are particularly intended for this role.

II

In the Adler-Barnett model, institutions or ‘third-parties’ are critical in building security communities because they contain norms and provide mechanisms that make states accountable to each other; institutionalize immediate (if not diffuse) reciprocity; identify common interests (or even identities) among a selected population; and produce charters and agendas, and convene meetings and seminars, that reflect the attempt to create a binding set of interests and a collective future. “Third-parties” can become region-builders (1998:52).

Institutions, according to this view, are sites where states socialize and reconstitute their interests; institutions, put bluntly, “may encourage states and societies to imagine themselves as part of a region” (Adler, quoted in Acharya 2001:23). The purpose of the following discussion is not to put forward positive evidence. Instead, my aim is to offer an explanation, more illustrative than speculative, of the SP as a security community-building institution. But first: why should the SP be seen as an institution?

The SP consists of two documents: the founding document adopted in Cologne on 10 June 1999 and a ‘solemn’ joint declaration of the Sarajevo Summit. The draft of the SP appears too glib to be considered as a treaty. The two documents are political declarations, not legal treaties and charters. Unlike a regular treaty, the SP does not contain articles, but sections and it is deliberately scant on details. The text offers broad goals: establishing long-term stability; fostering democratization and civil society; preserving ethnic diversity, protecting human rights and minorities; creating dynamic market economies; improving the infrastructure, health, and education; and combating crime and corruption. Yet how these goals might be best achieved is left open for interpretation. Not surprisingly, official publications are quick to recognize that the SP is not an organization: a claim is often made that the SP has no financial resources or implementation structures independent of those of the IGOs. Instead, the SP is presented as a political initiative that signifies a new willingness, between the international community and SEE states, to work more closely together in overcoming shared problems and reaching common goals.

The SP is divided into four thematic working groups or, as they are officially called, tables, which are themselves divided into a dozen sub-tables and
task forces, each consisting of the government delegations and representatives from the relevant players in the IGO sector. In addition to the institutionalization of inter-governmental dialogue, the nature of the Regional Working Table, or the Office of the Special Coordinator, I argue, makes the SP look and behave like an institution – a concrete structure with a specific mission and function. Institutions emphasize process over structure and are best defined as: “social practices consisting of easily recognized roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles” (Young, quoted in Adler and Barnett 1998:41). While firmly claiming not be an organization but no more than a venue for coordination of the process of regional stabilization and integration, the Special Co-ordinator’s team actively seeks to increase its own comfort level. In reality, the SP is involved in nearly all of the regional initiatives. Its ‘committee-style management’, while seen as antiquated and inefficient (ICG Report 2001:243), is a predominant form of regional cooperation. The Office clearly offers a preference or a structure on how this coordination is to be pursued. To be sure, this structure cannot be found in a blueprint. There is evidence to show that the SP activities take place outside the working table structure – in an improvised or impromptu fashion (Ibid.). It is the process – as delineated by the existence of norms and institutional contexts – that constitutes the very identity and self-perception of the actors in question. This means that the process – in addition to the structure – induces socialization, which, in turn, promotes social learning, trust-building (reciprocity) and the creation of regional identities and culture (intersubjectivity).

There is a striking similarity with OSCE. The Helsinki process at beginning was just that: a process without a strong organizational structure. Its agreements were nothing more than political statements and declarations, rather than legally binding international treaties. In addition, the working tables system resembles the “three baskets” system of the CSCE (later OSCE): like the SP’s tables, CSCE’s baskets also dealt with security, economy, and humanitarian concerns respectively. OSCE’s relatively successful evolution can be attributed, according to Adler, to two elements. First, the fact that OSCE is political, rather than legal means that “adherence to states intentions [is] a test of political credibility, rather than an invitation to search for legal loopholes” (Mastny in Adler 1998:137). Second, the lack of huge bureaucratic machinery also proved ‘compatible with the task of security-community building’, as it offered no formal structures though which non-governmental actors could be excluded. (Ibid.) For Acharya, the informal nature of the security community-building process was one of the prerequisites of ASEAN’s success (2001:25-6). And also like OSCE or ASEAN, the SP is above all an intergovernmental affair and its fortunes are generally determined by the states. The comparative success of OSCE and ASEAN, which have turned into the instruments of peaceful crisis management and conflict prevention in their respective regions, infuses some optimism about the model(s) followed by the SP.

During his visit to the EU on June 21, 1999, U.S. President Clinton applauded German Chancellor Schröder for launching the SP. The event
foreshadowed one of the more interesting features of the SP, the leading role of the EU in all but the security (NATO) dimension. While the Americans generally acknowledge their “major role” in the project, they quickly point out that Europe is to “provide the lion’s share of necessary resources.” (White House Fact Sheet 1999:1) The Europeans, however, repeat that they established no Marshall Plan: no new monies will be infused into the region. Instead, the objective of the SP is to build on functional cooperation already underway and to ensure that the existing resources are used in the best way possible. The project thus represents a merger of all previous efforts by the EU, OSCE, Council of Europe, IFIs and other multilateral and bilateral initiatives. Instead of the Marshall Plan, another model is often provided – the EU itself.

The main principle behind European integration has been and – arguably – remains intergovernmental cooperation to achieve shared goals. Hence, the people of the Balkans are to follow the example of Western Europeans and try to resolve their conflicts themselves through closer cooperation. Indeed, in June 1999, during the process of amendment of the German draft, the European Commission produced the so-called Stabilisation and Association Agreements or Process (SAAs or SAP). While they are bilateral in character (the Commission will proceed to negotiate EU accession with each candidate separately), they are complementary to the SP as one of the conditions for starting negotiations is ‘proven readiness to promote good neighbourly relations’. Together, the SP and SAAs form the dominant framework for a contractual relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans.

It is important to understand that the SP is not a product of a dialogue; instead, it is an institution imposed onto the Balkan states by the international community, or, to be more precise, the leading extra-regional players – from Brussels by way of Berlin. It sprang from repeated failures on the part of the EU to deal with the mounting crisis in Kosovo and in the earlier wars in Croatia and Bosnia. Two features of the “civilian power” strand of German and EU security and foreign policy – multilateralism and conflict prevention respectively – were embedded in the initiation of the SP.

First, the SP is multilateral in character on utilitarian grounds. The time is passed when a state could manage its own security. Today’s challenges include mass population movements, international organized crime, nuclear proliferation, small arms profusion, terrorism, and environmental pollution – all of which call for a comprehensive, multilateralized response. The project of that political, economic and, above all, financial scope can only hope to function if fully supported by the whole international community. In short, the SP, therefore, represents a common answer to a shared problem. The second reason is political. Multilateralism is a tool of policy; for big states it is a choice in favour of cooperation against hegemony while for small states it is an escape from seclusion or uneven bilateralism.

The second feature of German and European foreign and security policy present in the SP is the underlying commitment to the so-called culture of prevention – the promotion of constrains to the use of force in the international
arena. Conflict prevention is a choice for dialogue, negotiation, consent-seeking, and, when appropriate, ‘chequebook diplomacy’, against military intervention. Previous responses of the EU, or indeed the international community, to the crises in the Balkans were reactive and belated, which arguably contributed to the prolongation of the regional conflict in the past decade. For the extra-regional actors, the Kosovo intervention demonstrated, among other things, the limits of the reactive and selective approach to Balkan crises. The rationale behind the SP as a proactive venture is simple: the substantial aid and investment injected in the region is far cheaper than the alternative of organized violence, instability and military intervention. As for the selectivity, in Clinton’s words, the ‘piecemeal’ approach was dropped in favour of a regional one. The SP thus represents the first major instance of preventive action aimed at avoiding future interventionist conflict management operations. Michael Lund observes that prevention is the latest trend in conflict management, an underdeveloped concept and an untested practice (Lund 1996:6).

An argument is often made that by stabilizing the Balkans, the SP stabilizes the continent (Mintchev 2000:53). The rub is obvious: first, Balkan micronationalisms, however tangential in the big picture, represent a twofold threat to European security: first, they endanger the territorial integrity of the state and, second, keep the potential for the re-nationalization of European politics alive. The ideology of ‘Balkanization’ contrasts the European integration project. Second, the crises in the Balkans produced large numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers that naturally tend to flood the European member states, which creates many a headache for their governments. The emphasis on the EU’s, at the expense of the US, is deliberate. For Washington, SEE is a third-league interest and its involvement comes solely on the behalf of its European allies (Nye 1999:26).

Security communities are created by a ‘triggering mechanism’ – an important change of both material and normative content in the patterns of exchange within a regional system. In the Adler-Barnett model, these include war or a common threat. In the SP case, the trigger was the NATO intervention in Kosovo. While the idea of the SP predates the intervention in Kosovo, it was only after the signing of the cease-fire that the SP came to the fore. Had it not been for the increased sense of urgency and voracious search for solutions for the ongoing crisis, the whole design would likely have been buried in the administrative process in Brussels. For the states in the region, the Kosovo crisis, culminating in the NATO intervention, came as a lesson on their interdependence as well as their dependence on the Western community. A change in the ideational content included the introduction of common and cooperative security approaches, an important point further discussed below. In both respects, the patterns of exchange within the region were changed by an external intervention.

The SP, as the above section demonstrates, is primarily a Western import to the region, a set of transatlantic imperatives which are to be accepted by the local actors. My argument is here put to test: “a security community that depends heavily on enforcement mechanisms is probably not a security community”
The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

(Adler and Barnett 1998:50). The SP, I maintain, is a security community: it falls somewhere between a contractual and a coercive regional project, and stands in contrast to what one can regard as organic security communities, such as the USA-Canada or the EU.

The SP calls for ‘effective coordination’ between the regional (‘participating’) and extra-regional (‘facilitating’) states, organizations, and institutions (SP Draft:V). In a way, with the SP, SEE is firmly a part of a wider European region, or a wider security community, albeit one in which there is a clear power asymmetry. But in the Adler-Barnett model, “the development of a security community is not antagonistic to the language of power; indeed, it is dependent on it” (1998:50). There is no doubt that in the Balkans the rules and, more important, the norms of behaviour are set by the extra-regional actors. In fact, one must go so far as to consider the Western community as a hegemonic power in the region. Thus, the achievements of ‘collective membership’ and inter-regional cooperation in the SP are a product of the external hegemony which has the power to impose its will on weak Balkan states. Antonis Antanasiotis, for example, sees the SP as a tool of Western imperialism, which main purpose is the economic and political subjugation of the region by way of imposing the dominant neoliberal model of governance (2000:1). Such ‘rationalist’ argumentation is perhaps intuitive and easily builds on the otherwise atheoretical literature on Balkan international relations. To be sure, the SP can be seen as an organ of the hegemon’s self interest.

The coercive mechanisms can be easily found in the domain of economic and technical assistance, but, as Antanasiotis observes, also in the form of military intervention, like the one in Kosovo. I suggest that the most effective ‘coercive’ mechanism is the functional link with the European integration project: the actors are bound by the dependence on the prospect of association and accession with the EU. Brussels’ Balkan policy is opportunistic. As towards other Eastern European states, the accession process has been used to put pressure on Balkan countries over issues of special concern, particularly those that have traditionally bred violence in the past, such as minority issues. Put simply, accession progress is conditional on good performance in the realms of democracy and regional cooperation and integration. But for SEE states, hegemonic power of the West is reflected not so much by its air power as by the attractiveness of its ideas and values. Hegemony can thus be conducted smoothly. In Ole Waever’s words,

*The “Eastern” countries act according to anticipated Western judgments because of the prospect of membership. That is the reason why the EU rarely gives a no to an application for membership (only to Morocco, not Turkey, no country in the East), but always a “yes but”! This works even more strongly probably as a discipline than actual membership (cf. Greece)!*

The ‘prospect of membership’, one thing shared among the Balkan nations, is a fact acknowledged by the Special Co-ordinator Hombach as well:
The countries of the region recognize that the Stability Pact gives them the opportunity – and the duty – to meet EU standards and to draw the lessons of post-war European history... It is fair to say […] that the prospect of EU membership is the chief motor of the Stability Pact process. (2001:71)

In their attempt to join the EU, for example, the states in the region are voluntarily adapting the EU’s *acquis*, which entails a profound change of institutional framework as well as, as I suggest below, a change in the perceptions of norms, accountability, and legitimacy.

Western hegemony is accepted precisely because it is seen as based on a voluntary – contractual – agreement entered into by the people and their democratically elected leaderships. It is the perceived advantages associated with membership in the SP that outweigh the ‘subjugation’ concerns for two reasons. First, the participation in the new stability agreement is supplemental and corollary to the existing involvement of the Balkan states with other international institutions and regimes such as OSCE or the Council of Europe (for all) and the EU and NATO (for some). By accepting responsibilities in the new security framework, the SEE states presented themselves as dependable partners in the Euro-Atlantic community, a reference that can be listed as an additional asset in accession negotiations with NATO, for example.

Second, the Balkan states are interdependent and they all have a clear interest in strengthening regional stability and cooperation. The wars in the former Yugoslavia demonstrate how conflict disrupts trade patterns and investment flows. Because of the economic embargo and the following bombing campaign against Serbia, the region suffered losses of millions of US dollars to the region (Dempsey 2000:45). The Kosovo case also shows that mass refugee flows can adversely affect the internal security of the receiving states and that international military interventions regularly put the regional governments to the test. Yugoslavia’s neighbours faced a tough choice between backing NATO (by way of granting transit rights and providing political support) and satisfying their domestic constituencies (majorities in Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Macedonia opposed NATO’s strategy). The SP is a guarantee against being forced to make such choices. From a hegemon’s agent, however, the SP can develop into a structure that assumes independence of original intent. There is nothing to suggest that externally imposed arrangements cannot evolve into indigenous security bodies. The examples of NATO and OSCE demonstrate that the outside intervention can create the material conditions – a security environment – in which a special the SP culture can arise and a regional security dynamics can develop, self-directed or as sheltered as a sub-community within a larger region. Does such thing exist in the Balkans?

III
The SP is a product of the ‘diffusion’ of the OSCE model. Adler’s security community-building model is based on OSCE: “institutions…play a role in the intra- and inter-state political process that shape the political choices that make possible the development of security communities” (1998:151). The model contains six ‘special characteristics’ basic indicators of security-community building contained in the SP activities. These characteristics, the argument goes, reflect the institutions’ ability to mobilize the social forces within the states in question (socialization) and change the perceptions of both the decision-makers and societies about their security which allows for dependable expectation of peaceful change (reciprocity); in addition such institutions promote a ‘we-feeling’ across all local actors (intersubjectivity). In the foregoing discussion, I will test each of the characteristics against selected cases to determine the extent to which the OSCE security model has been diffused to the SP and, in turn, whether SEE can be considered a nascent security community.

1) ‘Cooperative security’. Security is a crucial precondition for stabilization. Tolerance and peace are possible so long as individuals, societies and states in question do not feel threatened. Security is conceived today as a multidimensional and multilevel concept. Due to the region’s critical position at the confluence of two or more empires and/or power blocs, the search for security in the Balkans has no doubt produced many international disputes. I have suggested that Balkan security discourse has now expanded to include the so-called common and comprehensive approaches to security. In the first, the SP represents a shift in Balkan security discourse. Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschutz demonstrate that the Western community’s policy of ‘relative inaction’ in the first half of 1990s was justified on the idea of divisible security (1997:149-185). In contrast, the SP declaration and the subsequent actions show that the extra-regional actors have a definite interest in the stability of the Balkans. The SP sees the region as a part of one Europe, which in the security context means that its problems are Europe’s problems too; security, therefore, is indivisible. As for the second, the SP recognizes that directly military aspects of security have declined in relevance. Many of these concerns are of an economic, societal, political or environmental character, and are not open to military solutions.

Unlike in the past, when Balkan security was compromised by the expansionist policies (in addition to the competitiveness of the extra-regional powers) of the emerging nation-states, the security agenda of today is largely internal, stemming from disputes over national identity and/or political legitimacy. Not only do the governments worry about defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nations they lead but their tasks include political stability, national unity, social peace, and, in some cases, their own hold on power. The main threat to the Balkan state today, writes an eminent historian, “comes from the international economy” (Mazower 2000:91). Clearly, the security discourse in the Balkans is broad. Accordingly, the SP has played a role in issues ranging from improving the roads to establishing respectable banking systems to arms control – certainly a product of comprehensive security thinking.
Cooperative security, according to Adler, is based on “confidence and cooperation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the work of mutually reinforcing multilateral institutions” (1998:120, 132). This approach has its origins in the discussion on Asia-Pacific in the early 1990s: it calls for a gradual, long-term attempt to developing regional institutions as well as the sustenance of informal and ad hoc security policies. These formal and informal mechanisms are crucial in building confidence and managing disputes for the benefit of all parties in question. Cooperative security contrasts the traditional self-help system. One way to coordinate security lies in the existing security approaches in the region, namely the NATO collective defense arrangement and its spin-offs, MAP and PfP. These two programs offer important frameworks for consultation and cooperation on issues including defence planning and democratization of civil-military relations. A military build-up exists in the region exists – as a prerequisite to joining NATO – but it is not competitive and directed against the neighbours. Also, NATO is not universally seen as a preferred security guarantor. Serbia, for one, was the only country to wage a war against this alliance and even the greatest believers in the Serbian democratization process are skeptical about the prospects of Belgrade making a rapprochement with the Alliance. That is the reason why the SP initiatives such as the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative (DPPI) and the Regional Mine Action are instrumental in increasing security cooperation in SEE. But above all, it is the founding of the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG) in September 1998 that makes some room for optimism regarding Balkan military cooperation.

The SP, like other security frameworks in the region, recognizes the state as the primary security referent. A majority of conflicts in the region, however, are a product of the twin processes of state- and nation-building. Mohammed Ayoob posits that these processes involve the almost inevitable use of violent means by the state as it attempts to extend and consolidate its control over contested demographic and territorial space, and counter-violence on the part of those segments of the population resisting the extension and consolidation of such control. This is the stuff of which civil wars and secessionist movements are made (1999: 250-1).

While some would argue that in the Balkans violent state-breaking sometimes precedes violent state-building, the dynamics remain the same. Also like in the Third World, these processes are rarely confined to the state in question; instead, they tend to become entangled in international disputes, often involving extra-regional intervention (Ibid.:251). Violent state-building (and/or state-breaking) was the source for much of the regional instability over the past decade in the Balkans and has not been exhausted as the current crisis in Macedonia demonstrates.

The case of Kosovo underscores Ayoob’s ‘inadequate stateness’ predicament. The former Serbian province is in a limbo: while all governments
involved still publicly uphold Serbia’s legal sovereignty over Kosovo, they realize the need for the revision of the *status quo*. A solution which would involve ‘conditional independence’ is problematic as it would run counter to the state-building efforts in Bosnia and Macedonia and would definitely include the dissolution of Yugoslavia. A development of a security community, itself contingent only on the absence of military threat at the state-to-state level, may not necessarily render the region stable. So long as the government legitimacy is seriously contested and the sub-state actors are unable to adequately participate in the relevant domestic and/or regional decision-making structures, the future of weak states (including international protectorates) is uncertain and so is the prospect of regional stability. The solution, claim the proponents of the SP, lies in exchanging the nation states for regional and European structures.

2) ‘Socialization and the teaching’ of norms of conduct. In the SP draft, the ‘participating’ and ‘facilitating’ parties, ‘solemnly reaffirm’ their commitment to the international norms of conduct contained in the legal documents from the UN Charter and relevant Resolutions to OSCE and CoE stipulations to the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia. With the SP, the international/Westphalian (e.g. sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force/peaceful settlement of disputes) and local (Dayton’s provisos of multiethnicity, refugee return etc.) norms received a regional character.

Acharya sees norms as legal-rational or socio-cultural: the former are formal, prescriptive, and regulatory; the latter are informal, constitutive, and “have a life on their own” (2001:24-5). More important, socio-cultural norms are seen as community-specific. The breach of sovereignty during the NATO intervention in Kosovo shows that legal-rational norms can be, under certain circumstances, circumvented by extra-regional powers. In this respect, the development of socio-cultural norms is more promising. In the case of ASEAN, the principle and practice of consensus is seen as a venerable norm, which has grown outside the legal and formal(istic) framework. The record of SEE is inconclusive. On one hand, the principle of regional autonomy may be coming to the fore, which is demonstrated by the exclusively regional nature of the organizations such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and SEEBRIG. In this regard, the SP is successful in its goal to link regional cooperation and integration efforts with European ones. On the other, in the management of the Macedonia crisis, the Balkan governments had to turn to the Western community again thus demonstrating limits for regional autonomy. Carl Bildt articulates a commonly held view when he contends that

> [...] endemic conflict is now held in check by a quarter of a million (sic!) NATO-led soldiers committed to the region. If the troops were withdrawn today, however, a new war would break out tomorrow. Self-sustaining regional stability remains a good distance away (2001:149).
3) Expectations of ‘international legitimacy’ and ‘accountability’ are a critical security community-building mechanisms. The SP, like OSCE, changes the identities and interest of former non-democratic states by diffusing a twofold expectation: first, there is the ‘international legitimacy’, where the government of the participating state is legitimate as long as it is democratic. Then there is the ‘accountability norm’, which denotes accountability of the SP members to one another for their action toward their citizens. While one can only speculate on if the states in the region feel accountable to each other, it is certain that both international legitimacy and accountability are sought by the participating governments. In fact, it is common sense that both are seen as main prerequisites for the continuation of EU accession negotiations. The delicate processes of association with and accession to the EU exert a strong influence on domestic and external relations of the states in the region.

The international community regularly intervenes in the process of regime transformation not only in its protectorates Kosovo and Bosnia. Valentin Stan demonstrates how the US embassy in Bucharest effectively stopped what it saw to be a punitive law on displaying foreign symbols from being passed in the parliament: “In Romania, this intervention was not generally considered an unfriendly act by the USA, but rather a sign of good US intentions” (Stan 2001: 154-5). In addition to direct intervention through association/accession conditionality terms (programs such as PHARE, and SAAs contain a series of mechanisms for the continuous monitoring of human rights, both for individuals and national minorities), avenues for influencing internal regime change include forging transnational political party, media, and civil society links. (Ibid.:155-6)

Following on this argument it can be said that the SP, as both the symbol and one of the vehicles of integration into the EU, assisted in isolating the autocratic rule of the nationalist cliques and partially explains the steady move away from ethnic authoritarianism in Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Kosovo. It also partially explains the restraint and generally cooperative posture used by the Macedonian and Serbian governments in handling the respective ethnic Albanian rebellions in northwestern Macedonia and the Presevo valley. The political pressure that stems from the international commitment to the SP establishes an environment favourable for moderates to get a foothold, which, in turn, guarantees easier cooperation in the region.

4) ‘System of Governance’ builds on the preceding characteristic. The SP, as a security community-building institution, possesses a set of constitutive norms. These norms, according to Adler, “can be conceived as a crude governance system” (Adler 1998:134). In contrast to the Deuschian model, Adler and Barnett assert that “states govern their domestic behaviour in ways that are consistent with the community” (Adler and Barnett 1998:36). By providing positive incentives, the SP gives encouragement to people to vote for moderates (liberal and reforming coalitions) and, at the same time, impedes the (re)emergence of autarkic, repressive and nationalist forces and policies in the region. Adler suggest that the constitutive norms create a ‘psychology of compliance’, a tendency on the part of the leaderships of the participating states
to follow the earlier commitments, which, in turn, institutes a rudimentary system of governance. For instance, despite the continued violent conflict with the Albanian extremists and in spite of the pressures of the majority of citizens, the Macedonian government had decided to proceed with the diffusion of power onto the ethnic Albanian minority even before the signing of the Ohrid Accords. Yet one can only speculate whether the commitment to the protection of minority rights comes out of the commitments declared in the SP and complementary venues. There is simply no clear evidence to support the claim that states feel ‘accountable’ to each other and that a ‘crude system of governance’ is under construction in SEE. The governments generally do not consult each other in regards to the changes in their foreign policies. The participating governments can also be seen as pragmatic and opportunistic political bodies who are willing to do whatever it takes to get significant material rewards related with EU association and accession processes. For example, ‘legitimacy’ in the Balkans, to be sure, also includes disclosing the accountability for the war crimes committed during the past decade. What impelled Serbia’s leadership to hand over Slobodan Milosevic to the war crimes tribunal in The Hague is not the popular desire to be included in the political map of the new Europe, but pragmatic and opportunistic aims to secure financial aid for the desolate country.

5) ‘Community-building Devices’ include a number of features. Before the SP, the Balkans seemed to be nearly bereft of any mechanisms of multilateral discussion of security issues; now, the working table on security offers a forum for consensus-seeking discussions and exchanges. Pre-SP initiatives, such as the BSEC, advanced by the Turkish government in April 1997 have received an impetus in the SP process; BSEC is frequently used an example that regional cooperation is possible and as a model for further ventures. Also, multilateral cooperation at the SP level can spill over onto the level of bilateral relations, thus making it possible for the resolution of inter-state disputes, the example of which can be the recent ease in tensions between Greece and Turkey.

The SP plays a crucial role in diminishing that psychological feeling of insecurity, which can often lead to ill-advised policy. Territorial disputes, for one, are rendered less explosive as there is the SP to offer a forum for the peaceful negotiation. The successful resolution of all border disputes between Bosnia and Croatia following the Sarajevo Summit stands as an example of such function. Similarly, the SP successfully mediated, outside the working tables structure, in settling a decade-old dispute between Romania and Bulgaria over the location of the second bridge of the Danube between these two countries. The task remains formidable, however. Outstanding border disputes exist almost between each pair of states in the region. Another immediate source of instability is the two million strong refugee population, generated by the decade of conflict in the former Yugoslavia. These forced migrants are still unable to return to their homes, despite the political and financial efforts on the part of the international community to make it so.

The SP, following OSCE postulates, introduces confidence- and security building measures (CSBMs): it fosters greater transparency with regard to
military activities, the formation of the register of regional arms as well as the creation of regional peacekeeping initiatives, not to mention measures such as arms control. The establishment of a new Regional Arms Control, Verification, and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) in Zagreb in October 2000 is considered to be the first step in increasing the transparency of military affairs in the region. The promotion of transparency, arms control, and CSBMs reduces not only the dangers of armed conflict but also the possibility of miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension. The support that Macedonian government received during the 2001 ethnic crisis demonstrates that the gap between the normative prescriptions and actual behaviour of the states is closing. All regional countries, including Albania, acknowledged the principle of interregional non-interference and supported the limited use of force against the ethnic Albanian rebels; some, like Greece and Bulgaria, assisted the Macedonian government militarily as well.

6) ‘Cognitive Region and Agent States’ refers to the ways and benefits of imagining regional identity. According to Alexandru Dutu, because SEE societies face the same problems of modernization and transition as well as because the region belongs to the European civilization, common identity is strong (1995: 83-4). Dutu is far off the mark. At the present, regional identity in SEE is minimal. This is not surprising given that, according to the Adler-Barnett model, a distinct regional collective identity occurs only at the ascendant phase. The so-called constitutive effects of norms cannot be easily identified. Determining whether two or more actors share identity can be done, according to the Adler-Barnett model, through the actor’s normative discourse. Common projects increase the opportunities of social exchange, which in turn, allows for ‘redefinition’ and ‘reinterpretation’ of reality (or a perception thereof) and encourage belief in and the development of common identity (1998:43-4, 54). The SP documents recognize the ‘mutually reinforcing’ relationship between the norms established and developed in these initiatives and the international ones (SP Draft:VI) Redefinition of reality is most clearly attempted at the SP level. In addition to the constituent documents, almost all official texts of the SP contain a reference to the idea(l) of one Europe. In a series of appeals to the people of Serbia before the October 2000 revolution, the Special Co-ordinator Hombach regularly talked about a ‘European future for Serbia.’ This can be interpreted as a conscious attempt at common (here meaning European) identity building. Outside recognition of SEE’s new identity can prove to be a strong region-building mechanism.

In sharp contrast, the idea of a regional collective identity is disputed among some member states of the SP. The case of Croatia is particularly instructive. Zagreb had strong reservations about being incorporated into the SP. The Croatian argument was rash and emotional: the signing of some Balkan agreement was considered a first step towards the establishment of another regressive, dysfunctional, and Eastern Orthodox–dominated federation or, in the words of one commentator, “an expanded new Yugoslavia, now called ‘Southeastern Europe’” (Freundlich 1999:1). Probably for the same reasons, in
September 2001 the Croatian government refused to negotiate on a German plan for an economic union among the countries of the Western Balkans. Similarly, the Croatian delegation to the Regional Conference, which took place in Bucharest in November 2001, was the only one to insist that that the SP and SAP should be seen as distinct, if complimentary projects. These reactions represent a typical fear on the part of newly established states in the region; the much-awaited and hard-fought state sovereignty would be severely compromised if drawn into a multinational community.

On a more fundamental level, the opposition to the idea of regional identity comes as a result of the historically divergent patterns of regionalization, but also because of the internalization of the Western discourse on the Balkans. During the Yugoslav wars, Croatia systematically constructed its (‘European’) identities in opposition to a common Balkan identity. Following this discourse, Christopher Cvivic sees regional cooperation as possible only inasmuch as it develops in two distinct communities: Kleinmitteleuropa, consisting of predominantly Catholic states, and Balkania, encompassing the states of ‘the Orthodox tradition’ (1995:126). It is perhaps because of such ‘national’ sensitivities that the SP officials have been reluctant to revive historical examples of regional cooperation. Be that as it may, many Croat intellectuals realize that ‘national’ imaginary space is subject to varying degrees of dispute and that, at best, ‘(Mittel)European’ and ‘Balkan’ are not mutually exclusive and, at worst, that they are but two of a number of discourses that vie for dominance in the realm of Croatia’s identities (Lindstrom and Rasza 2000:23). After all, the struggle between national and transnational identities is evident throughout contemporary Europe.

The example of ASEAN shows that identity can be derived from regulatory norms, such as non-interference. In this regard, the SP looks promising. But more important, the SP induces a creation of regional culture based on common values of liberal democracy, which when (or if) consolidated may prove to be a strong region-builder. In the Deutschian model, liberal democracy was listed as a key prerequisite for the establishment of a security community. While the work by Acharya has shown that security communities can develop in regional milieux with strong non-democratic content, the collective commitment to liberal democracy in the Balkan region can be certainly added to the credit side. All participating and facilitating states, as well as some of the most important sub-state groups, function on democratic ideas and practices.

In the meantime, the SP has a task of cultivating the working tables system (sometimes denigrated as talk- or workshoping) represents an attempt to institutionalize what is known as seminar diplomacy – “the diplomatic practice of teaching norms and [legitimizing] expertise as the basis of agreements” (Adler 1999:138). As it is the case in seminar diplomacy, the working groups are responsible for drafting, presenting, discussing, and coordinating projects, papers, and reports which are then discussed at larger plenary sessions. In addition to intensifying personal contacts and thus accelerating the process of
learning among the elite, the advantage of seminar diplomacy is that it allows the participation of the civil society as well as the employment of institutional and technical innovations. This is particularly important in a region which is deficient in diplomatic structures and, to a large extent, diplomatic traditions as well.

The SP is a multitrack process. In October 2000, Working Table I adopted a charter on NGO-government partnership in the region. Usually, the intergovernmental level of interaction therefore combines with the nongovernmental one. But there are examples of an emerging regional civilian society opposing the SP (as well as many other international institutions) on issues of human rights, democracy, and environment. In either case, the process of social learning is thus expanded onto societies, which develop their set of shared references, if not shared beliefs. While facing the same problems does not automatically imply shared identity (as Dutu claims), the coordinated attempts to tackle these problems can bind states together in more ways than one. The case of the EU shows that regional identity can also develop through the coordination of efforts to improve infrastructure and expand free trade. For some, ‘Europeanization’ of the Balkans means – above all – “a staged liberalization of the flow of goods, capital, and ultimately labour” (Steil and Woodward 1999:103). The SP, in close cooperation with SECI, was instrumental in assisting the creation of joint border controls, like the ones between Bulgaria and Macedonia. More important, since 1998, a free trade area has been growing in SEE. It started with a free trade agreement between Slovenia and Macedonia, the agreements between Croatia and Slovenia, Macedonia and Croatia, Macedonia and Bulgaria, Macedonia and Turkey followed. In June 2001, seven regional states signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Liberalising Trade in the Region, which will increase the number of free trade accords in SEE and, ostensibly, contribute to the stimulation of growth and foreign direct investment. To the latter end, the SP-led Investment Compact – a program to accelerate policy reform aimed at increasing private investment in the region – has been fruitful: in less than a year, almost thirty percent of the proposed reform bills have been passed into laws (OECD/Investment Compact Report 2001). The creation and the expansion of a free trade are will have the effect in broadening of the SP postulates, away from political consultation and coordination towards practical economic cooperation. The history of the EU shows that integration starts through political initiatives and, when these are depleted or sidetracked, switches to ever-increasing economic cooperation.

On the debit side, it can also be argued that the most enduring examples of intra-Balkans cooperation remain in the domain of corruption and organized crime. These two problems are commonly seen as one of the most obdurate security challenges as it is directly contrary to the interests and objectives of the stabilization process and can stifle the willingness of the international community to help in the sustenance and the development of the fragile communities like Bosnia and Kosovo in particular and the region in general. The corruption and organized crime problem partly originates in the uncertainties and disorder that inevitably accompany the transition of former communist states to liberal
democratic institutions and free markets, itself a larger challenge to the stabilization process. Indeed, the example of European integrations shows that sustainable economic development is one of the main prerequisites for stability. Therefore, the single most pressing security concern in the region, it can be argued, is the process of post-Communist transition. If economic conditions fail to improve, or if they worsen, then forms of chauvinistic ethno-nationalism and authoritarian populism may well find fertile soil.

Forging a regional identity is no easy task. Unlike ASEAN, SP has not attempted to consciously work on constructing symbols of regional identity. The ‘ASEAN Way’ or ‘ASEAN Spirit’ is powerful construction which serves to distinguish the region from the rest of the world. ASEAN’s founders were able to lay a claim to a ‘cultural-specific’ approach to conflict management and decision-making, which prefers informal quid pro quo bargaining over more legalistic frameworks of the European tradition. Because the SP is a derivative of OSCE, which stands in contrast to ASEAN, the construction of an analogous ‘Balkan Spirit’ is unlikely. Nevertheless, symbols, such as one that would explicitly link the ‘Balkans’ and ‘Europe’, would greatly assist the SP’s normative narratives in the attempts to construct a regional political identity – a set of shared assumptions, symbols, and meanings that discursively structure the actor’s understanding of interregional and international politics.

The exploration of the six ‘special characteristics’ demonstrates that there is ample evidence to support the claim that the SP is yet another institution onto which OSCE security community-building model has diffused. Some of the characteristics are more manifest than others. The determining characteristics are all in place: organizational emulation (OSCE, EU), testing of the nature of the ongoing exchanges, and reliance on institutions, which play a crucial role in interpreting, deepening and extending this exchange. Indeed, a cursory look at its recent activities, shows that the SP has had a ‘spill-over’ effect. The SP appears confident in cultivating legal-rational norms in the areas of security and economics, such as peaceful resolution of border disputes or free trade. Norms that make up the idea practice of sovereignty allow for sustained policy coordination, such norms are clearly constitutive. Thus, before the governments of the former Yugoslavia’s successor states agreed to the reciprocal recognition of sovereignty (‘legitimacy’), no policy coordination took place even over pressing common issue-areas, such as the problem of refugees and internally displaced persons. But in establishing intergovernmental ‘accountability’ or constructing regional identity, the SP shows weakness. All the same, SEE can be characterized to be a security community in the nascent phase of the Adler-Barnett model, not least because there may be evidence of token shared identity in the region, as reflected in the growing number of autonomous regional multitrack entities, emerging diplomatic community, outside recognition, shared problems, and the history of cooperation (parallel, if inferior to the history of conflict). This transnational identity – if indeed any – remains a phenomenon reserved for the political, diplomatic and economic elites. Series of bilateral and multilateral ministerial and deputy meetings on the issues such as energy, crime,
communications and transport now take place on a regular basis. It is such social contacts between the states and societies in the region that show the evolution of elite networks, who are themselves the primary benefactors of social learning and thus the main carriers of identity redefinition.

Instead of continuing with finer points of the problems of regional order, such as Kosovo, or inherent shortcomings of the institution, it is more germane to this discussion to concentrate on the problem of participation. Most states in the region have a poor sense of belonging to (let alone owning) the stabilization process. It is safe to say that most governments in the region believe that they can best achieve integration with the EU if they unilaterally pursue the negotiations of SAAs. The common interest of the Balkan states – accession to the EU – can also be seen as competing and conflicting. Half-baked participation (or lack thereof) of the states in the region has a potential to render the SP ineffective and irrelevant more than anything else.

In contrast, if the SP is accepted as the medium for regional dialogue, it can go a long way in transforming the political relations between and within states and societies. This should not be seen as impossible as the SP has one comparative advantage over other bodies. The explicit comparative advantage of the SP is that it actively tries to bring the locals, governments and NGOs alike, and their proposals to the table. Any other strategy, which would marginalize the role of the locals, would deny agency to the regional actors and, if the history of the extra-regional involvement in the last decade is any indicator, is doomed to fail or, worse, become counterproductive. The SP has a potential to become a transnational instrument for stabilization, cooperation and integration. Regional cooperation often has a domestic political and societal drive behind it. For example, many of the more liberal-minded intellectuals, students, sports and cultural organizations, in the region have been successfully working together to contribute to a new Balkans. A security community, therefore, does not be defined in exclusive security terms; in fact, a security community in the Balkans may not be carried by the logic of military cooperation but by distinctive non-security platforms, such as a regional professional basketball league. Thus even when it is not explicitly stated, regional cooperation, within or outside the SP framework, allows for a further development of a security community in SEE.

Conclusions

The Great Powers were heavily involved in the new states’ internal affairs. They appointed kings from the unemployed scions of Europe’s princely houses, drew up their constitutions and selected teams of military advisers...They defined borders and adjusted territories at diplomatic conferences and imposed their wishes on all parties through gunboat diplomacy and economic arm-twisting (Mazower 2000:90-1).
Ignore ‘new’; substitute ‘kings’ for ‘representatives and special co-ordinators’, ‘princely houses’ for ‘diplomatic community’, and ‘gunboat’ for ‘airpower’ and this account of the nineteenth century Balkans becomes an accurate description of the current situation. Regional security in SEE continues to be determined by the international climate and the extra-regional players who are able to underwrite its security. The presence of extra-regional actors is likely to remain indispensable for general stability of the region. Prior to the Kosovo intervention, these extra-regional players pursued defensive, short-term, and, above all, unimaginative policies. The SP, I have argued, is the first creative response to a historic challenge to create a peaceful, stable, and prosperous region in an area where such attributes have been rare. It was adopted as a long-term project and the interests will converge gradually as the region becomes knotted in a web of political, economic and social interdependencies. Its explicit aim is not only to stabilize the region, but also to integrate it into the European mainstream. In this sense, as noted earlier, SEE can be seen as a sub-region, therefore only partially responsible for its own security.

The SP was conceived and created despite the comparative lack of historical antecedents. Similarly, it is now maintained by an act of political will despite many factors which work against regionalism. The crisis in Macedonia demonstrated that the SP has neither the diplomatic weight nor the economic capabilities to be a decisive and clinching factor in the maintenance of regional stability and security. Nevertheless, its achievements in the other areas suggest that the SP closely approximates a security community-building institution. In extension, the SP provides a solid framework for the establishment of the material and ideational conditions conducive to the emergence of a nascent security community in SEE. This inference, it must be noted, is possible because the concept of a nascent security community is significantly broad. For more conclusive evidence, however, one would need to resort to the investigation of the construction of norms and shared identities at the unit-level, within the ‘participating’ states. As noted above, an analysis of political narratives could do a better job.

As it is indeed common, the nascent phase of this security community is characterized by a myriad of shortcomings. A great deal of doubt regarding the prospects for a security community in SEE is to found in mistrust and acrimony which continues to exist among the actors, particularly those that operate outside the institutional frameworks. Also, only minimal regional identity is detectable, with no firm guarantees of its further growth. If, however, the actors do manage to put an end to the ongoing violence (or at least put it under control) and continue to nurture common regional and European projects, the SP has good chances of developing a Balkan security community.

In this regional arrangement, the stakeholders are both the insiders and outsiders. Hanns Maul voices the opinion of many with his claim that “the Balkans will make or break Europe’s new security and defence policies” (2000:75). The EU has the most to lose if the project fails. As the initiator and the main contributor to the project, Brussels has put its credibility at stake: first, it
does not want see the money of its taxpayers go to waste. Second, as the SP represents a chance for the EU to finally assume a security role commensurate with its economic might and, indeed, its stage of integration. Of course, the practice of “chequebook conflict prevention” has one inherent major deficiency. Governments, seeking to get reelected, are habitually weary of the foreign and security policy enterprises that are cost-intensive in the short run. The future of the SP will depend on the ability of its coordinating team to explain, as well as the willingness of the ‘facilitating’ contributors to accept, the long-term advantages of the project more than validate its immediate costs. The steady inflow and prudent allocation of international financial aid is the prerequisite of Balkan stability. Finally, there seems to be an expectation – on the part of its allies and partners – that the EU will continue to exercise the leadership role; the SP is supposed to demonstrate to the US that Europe can handle its own problems. The reactive solution – humanitarian intervention – is a poor alternative; it is always costly and, particularly in the case of the military variant, risky and controversial.

Two scenarios of the SP’s development can be proposed. The first calls for further structuralization and institutionalization of the process, which includes the increase in authority and personnel of the SP. The OSCE model would be likely followed in this scenario. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe, signed as the OSCE summit in November 1990, codified “European” values and made room for the creation of vital decision-making bodies (such as the Ministerial Council and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) and mechanisms (such as ‘consensus minus one’ voting system). To this end, a strong commitment of the extra-regional powers will be required. Put otherwise, the principal creators of the SP will have to further engage politically and ante up resources for the deepening of this institution. The second scenario suggests the ASEAN model of development. The SP would continue as a largely informal process with a minimal institutional structure, where the onus of cooperation would fall exclusively on the shoulders of the local actors. The regional projects such as BSEC or SEECP along with the improvement and expansion of informal political, economic and social ties would come to the fore. In this case, regional stabilization and cooperation would turn into a predominantly self-supported operation. Security communities, to be sure, are results of specific historical conjectures. SEE, too, may decide to follow a road unmapped by either scenario. For one, the constructed path-dependence of security communities (nascent, ascendant, mature) should not imply a linear progression, but should allow for setbacks and failures. The disintegration of Tito’s Yugoslavia in the 1990s can also be interpreted as the collapse of a security community.
This paper is a shortened version of my MA paper. For detailed comments and criticisms, I am grateful above all to David Dewitt and David Mutimer, my supervisors at York University, and to two anonymous referees at SEEP. The paper has also benefited from presentations at the conferences at the CREES, University of Toronto, and at the YCISS, York University, in the spring 2001.

1 For a review of definitions of the Balkans, see Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 15-18. The northern border of the region has been rather elastic. The SP’s ‘institutional’ definition of SEE is possibly the broadest one so far, as it includes Moldova and Hungary. In this paper too, like in the majority of literature dealing with the region, the double terminology (Balkans/SEE) seems unavoidable.

2 The neologism Western Balkans – also adapted by drafters of the SP under the term Zielgebiet (target region) – describes the ‘conflict-ridden area’ consisting of four successor states of the former Yugoslavia plus Albania. The rest – Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece and Turkey – belong to the outer group of states, which enjoy more stable internal and external relationships, even though they too are not free of security problems, as the case of the lasting row between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, the Aegean seabed, and the resulting competitive arms build up in the first half of the 1990s demonstrates.

3 The nation building process in the Balkans is a “transition between the way nations were formed in Europe at the beginning of the present era and the nation-building now going on in the developing countries” (Pasic 1973: 118). One should note that nationalism as a political project has varied greatly in different contexts in the Balkans.

4 Again, the national variations are significant. Transitologists, for example, note that while the Balkans are ‘a special set of cases’, a distinctive ‘Balkan model’ cannot be constructed. See Pridham and Gallaher (2000: 15, 21).

5 For the sake of brevity, these important theoretical considerations will be left out. It should be noted that the Adler-Barnett model of security communities is far more encompassing than the Deutschian model and that considerable overlap exists. Acharya observes, between ‘regulatory’ security regimes and ‘constituitive’ security communities (2001:209). The Hasenclever *et al.* volume (1997) is particularly useful in differentiating between what it calls rationalist (interest-based and power-based) and cognitivist (knowledge-based) theories of international regimes. The security community model belongs in the latter–here called constructivist–group. On the “proliferation of constructivisms” in IR, see Fierke and Jørgensen (2001).

6 German’s EU presidency coincided with its presidency in the G8 and in the now defunct WEU, and the solutions for Balkan stability were presented in all three fora. While the triple presidency certainly provided Berlin with important leverage during the negotiations, its confidence was most significantly increased by Germany’s involvement in the Kosovo intervention. For a comprehensive account on the political and diplomatic origins of the SP, see Biermann (1999).
The concept of hegemony in IR is commonly tied to the rationalist and systemic concept of power, which contains both materialistic and institutional content. A hegemon is broadly defined as a “state powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations and willing to do so.” (Keohane and Nye 1977:77).

While the declaration and the draft of the SP do not provide for the possibility of exclusion or opt-out, it would be not difficult to imagine a situation where a state becomes excluded from the SP’s provisos and its prospect for the accession to the EU becomes hampered. Such an event would reinforce the coercive elements of this regional security relationship, at the expense of the contractual ones. On the EU’s conditionality principle vis-à-vis SEE, see Steil and Woodward (1999:99).

Ole Waever, “Insecurity, Security and Asecurity, in the West European Non-War Community,” in Adler and Barnett, p. 99. As for hegemonic theory, there are different strands. In comparison to the realist conception of power, the so-called neo-Gramscian paradigm stresses the influence of ideas in addition to institutions and material capabilities. See Cox (1996). In this scheme, Balkanism plays a major role.

For more on Kosovo, see the report by the Independent International Commission (2001).

Admittedly, common cultural identity is low in the region. The heavy involvement of the extra-regional powers also meant that the regional states have been drawn into other patterns of regionalization, a development based on interest as well as geography, ethnicity, religion and culture. For example, while Slovenia and Croatia considered themselves part of Mitteleuropa and their leanings have historically been towards the German-speaking states; Montenegro and Bulgaria habitually sided with Russia.

For more on this phenomenon, see Bakic-Hayden (1995) and Norris (1999).

This has been done elsewhere. See the EastWest Institute/ESI report the SP, 4 April 2001.

This attitude is problematic for the SP, not least because SAAs are seen as a zero-sum game. “Instead of betting on regional co-operation, every Central and East-European country tries to be better placed for integration with EU and NATO and consequently it finds itself in direct competition with its neighbours.” Peter Schmidt, quoted in Stan (2001:161).

References


Antanasiotis, Antonis. “The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe: A Continuation of the War Against Yugoslavia and the Balkans by ‘Peaceful’ Means,” (Greek Committee for International Détente and Peace) April 2000,


